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 Abstract 
Tobias Debiel/Sascha Werthes (eds.): Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: 
Changes, Concepts and Cases. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, Uni-
versity of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 80/2006). 
When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published 
its 1994 report, nobody expected that the human security concept outlined 
within it would attract so much attention from politicians and academics alike. 
This is all the more astonishing as the concept has provoked a lot of criticism 
ever since its first appearance due to its excoriated analytical ambiguity and its 
disputed political appropriateness. 
One of the significant changes (see Debiel/Werthes) of human security 
concepts is that they put special emphasis on a horizontal and vertical exten-
sion. Thereby, new types of threats are taken into account with regard to a new 
referent object. Basically, all these concepts have in common that the object of 
security is not limited to the state but also includes the individual – no matter 
where he/she lives. Hence, these concepts implicitly emphasise that the various 
safety threats must be addressed though multilateral processes and by taking 
into account the patterns of interdependence that characterize the globalized 
world. 
As if such an extraordinary extension would not be a big enough chal-
lenge for states and the international community as such, Debiel/Werthes and 
Werthes/Bosold (with regard to the members of the Human Security Network) 
point out how human security understood and accepted as a political leitmotif 
might have and might produce significant leverage on foreign policy agendas, 
as it might serve particular states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selected 
functions in the process of agenda-setting, decision-making and implementa-
tion. This might to a certain degree explain why different and ambiguous hu-
man security concepts despite criticism have gained so much attention especially 
in the political field. 
The case studies by Atanassova-Cornelis, Gropas, and Liotta/Owen further 
exemplify these aforementioned ideas when illustrating human security on the 
Japanese foreign policy agenda, or when studying the link between human 
security and human rights, and even when comparing the European Human 
Security doctrine with the US National Security Strategy with regard to poten-
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Foreword 
The long awaited Human Security Report (October 2005), prepared un-
der the leadership of Andrew Mack, or UN-Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
Report “In larger Freedom: toward development, security and human rights for 
all” (March 2005) exemplify that human security is of great interest for foreign, 
security and development policy. Moreover, it has a great potential to offer for 
the scientific community. 
It all began, more or less, with the 1994 Human Development Report. 
Over a decade ago, this UNDP Report basically encouraged international initia-
tives like the Human Security Network and the Commission on Human Secu-
rity or the campaign leading to the 1997 Convention on Anti-Personnel Land-
mines that popularized ‘human security’. Human security is now a term fre-
quently used in speeches and common to find on web pages of various foreign 
policy departments (e.g. Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland) and research 
institutes. However, even though “‘human security’ has entered the lexicon of 
international politics, the concept nonetheless remains highly controversial” 
(Hampson 2002: v). 
This report summarizes spirited debates on human security with regard 
to its impact on foreign policy agendas and its practical implications for activi-
ties in the policy fields of human development, human rights, and even hu-
manitarian interventions which mainly took place at a panel at the 3rd European 
Consortium for Political Research Conference in Budapest, September 2005. Origi-
nally initiated by the Standing Working Group on Human Security (AG Hum-
Sec) at the University of Marburg, the panel “Human Security and/on Foreign 
Policy Agendas – Theoretical and Practical Implication” was jointly organised 
with the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), which runs a project on 
“Human Security in Theory and Practice” (http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/ 
projekt.php?lang=en). 
The papers presented here hopefully offer the curious reader an interest-
ing and challenging new way of looking at what constitute the main threats to 
peace and security and how different actors try to respond to it when emphasis-
ing ‘human security’. Moreover, the papers explore the strength and weakness 
of human security as a political leitmotif when becoming an organizing princi-
ple for foreign policy departments. We were fortunate and privileged to be able 
to gather an interesting group of international experts: Elena Atanassova-Cornelis 
(University of Leuven), David Bosold (University of Marburg), Ruby Gropas (Hel-
lenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP), P. H. Liotta (Pell 
Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Newport), Taylor Owen 
(Oxford University). 
Finally, we like to thank all the paper givers and various contributors in 
the discussions at the conference in Budapest, as well as the participants of the 
INEF research colloquiums and the members of the project group for their in-
teresting and helpful feedback. 
–– Dr. Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes 
Duisburg, February 2006 
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Human Security is increasingly 
shaping foreign policy agendas. The 
International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) and the Ottawa 
Treaty as well as the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) cannot be understood without 
referring to the orientation, co-
ordination and mobilization enabled 
by this new “political leitmotif”. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s development pol-
icy and Canada’s foreign policy (see 
also Switzerland’s Political Affairs 
Department IV) have incorporated 
Human Security as one of their core 
principles and facilitated a more peo-
ple-centred, bottom-up approach in 
the field of international assistance 
and international security policy. Fur-
thermore, the current debate on state 
sovereignty and intervention strongly 
leans on the idea that states bear a 
responsibility to protect the security 
of their citizens and – if they fail to do 
so – have to face serious responses 
from the international community. 
Last but not least, Javier Solana trig-
gered a controversial debate on a 
Human Security Doctrine for the EU. 
The above-mentioned devel-
opments so far do not by themselves 
indicate a substantive shift in Interna-
tional Relations towards norm-based 
performance. Especially when taking 
into account the most recent devel-
opments such as the Iraq War (since 
2003), U.S. opposition to the ICC, evi-
dence on extra-legal detainments in 
the “war on terror” etc., even the con-
trary might be true. However, one can 
nevertheless argue that the discourse 
on foreign policy goals has changed 
significantly over the last decade. 
New international regimes, a more 
pro-active role of the UN Security 
Council as well as the setting up of 
new international institutions prove 
that this new discourse on a more 
‘ethical’ foreign policy has an impact 
– be it significant or marginal, be it 
desirable from the observer’s point of 
view or not. 
When the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) pub-
lished its 1994 report, nobody ex-
pected that the human security con-
cept outlined within it would attract 
so much attention from politicians 
and academics alike. This is all the 
more astonishing as the concept has 
provoked a lot of criticism ever since 
its first appearance due to its analyti-
cal ambiguity and its disputed politi-
cal appropriateness. However, ex-
tending the analytical and contextual 
focus of security as such is not so ex-
traordinary as one might think. Dif-
ferent security concepts such as com-
mon, extended, and comprehensive 
security already broadened the politi-
cal agendas. What is new and chal-
lenging is on the one hand the chang-
ing/deepening of the perspective: the 
individual is to be taken into account 
as an object of reference in addition to 
the state. In practical terms this 
means, as advocates of the human 
security approach point out, that on 
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the other hand today’s political ap-
proaches to security have to more 
strongly integrate elements of foreign 
and development policy. This shift 
might be linked to the rising aware-
ness that if security policy in an inter-
dependent and globalized world is 
desired to be successful, it has to ad-
dress more seriously the root causes 
of insecurity for states, and, equally or 
even more importantly, for people. 
In our introductory article, we 
briefly sketch how in general the se-
curity agenda has been changed in the  
last two decades by the horizontal 
and vertical extension of issues and 
reference objects. Secondly, we argue 
that human security provides a pow-
erful “political leitmotif” for particu-
lar states and multilateral actors by 
fulfilling selected functions in the 
process of agenda-setting, decision-
making and implementation. Finally, 
we introduce the selected case studies 
dealt with in this report, which nicely 
illustrate the implications human se-




1. Changes: The Extension of the Security 
Agenda 
Far into the 1980s international 
security politics tended to focus on 
military threats emanating from oth-
ers states (Debiel/Werthes 2005: 8, 
Werthes/Debiel 2006/2007). Most clas-
sical definitions (see e.g. Lippman 
1943: 51) are based on a state-centred 
security perspective highlighting the 
importance of territorial integrity, po-
litical independence, survivability, 
and the capability to protect its own 
citizens. They assume that most 
threats are of external origin and, 
even more importantly, military in 
nature (Ayoob 1995: 5). Therefore the 
convincing ability to respond with 
(overwhelming) military means was 
regarded as sufficient. 
One can easily contest the ap-
plicability of this security concept in 
regard to today’s world. For example, 
the wilful neglect of states’ sensitivity 
to situations in neighbour-ring states 
and strategically important regions is 
highly problematic in traditional se-
curity concepts. Nye (1974) already 
pointed out, when analysing the oil 
crisis (1970s), that in the age of inter-
dependence the security of states can 
also be endangered by non-military 
developments (Nye 1974). Further-
more, the adherence to an increas-
ingly outmoded perspective that vio-
lent conflicts are still primarily con-
flicts between states, or inter-state 
conflicts, neglects the fact that most of 
the threats to security, especially in 
the crisis regions of the south, in the 
Caucasus, and in central Asia, coin-
cide with internal processes of state 
transformation and consolidation 
(Ayoob 1995, Paris 2004, Hippler 
2005). Finally, the capability of a 
country to protect its own citizens, 
which was previously emphasised, 
clearly asked too much of these classi-
cal security concepts, as the new 
threats which endangered citizens 
could apparently not be dealt with by 
military means. 
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These limits induced the hori-
zontal broadening of the international 
security agenda. With proponents of 
the Strategic Studies (in the 1980s) and 
subsequently furthered by multilater-
alists (in the 1990s) step by step new 
security concepts emerged, mainly 
referred to as extended or comprehen-
sive security concepts. These concepts 
not only incorporated an economic 
and environmental dimension, they 
also took into account a broad spec-
trum of additional threats to the secu-
rity of states (e.g. cross-border refugee 
migration, the spread of epidemics, 
gross violations of human rights). 
Nevertheless, they did not undermine 
the Realist logic of conventional Secu-
rity Studies and remained mainly 
state-centred in that they still focused 
on the security of the state and its in-
tegrity and not so much on the capa-
bility to protect its citizens. 
Common and comprehensive se-
curity concepts, on the contrary, im-
ply a slight change in the perception 
of the world, as the perspective no 
longer focuses solely on the interna-
tional system of states, but conceives 
the world as an international society 
of states. Basically, the comprehension 
of the world as an international sys-
tem of states seduces the analyst to 
focus primarily on “power politics 
amongst states, and puts the structure 
and process of international anarchy 
at the centre of IR theory” (Buzan 
2004a: 7), whereas the perspective of 
the international society of states “is 
about the institutionalisation of 
shared interest and identity amongst 
states, and puts the creation and 
maintenance of shared norms, rules 
and institutions at the centre of IR 
theory” (Buzan 2004a: 7). Common 
and comprehensive security thus not 
only accentuate power, but also em-
phasise the chances of (inter-national) 
law to enhance security (of states) or 
in other words to address security 
threats. 
When in the 1990s the so-called 
“Copenhagen School” (CS) emerged, 
another shift took place. This ap-
proach not only broadened (taking in 
some non-military issues to the range 
of threats to states), but also empha-
sized that non-military issues can be 
considered matters of security even if 
they are not threatening states (Buzan 
et al. 1998). It emphasises that threats 
and vulnerabilities in different areas, 
military and non-military, have to 
meet strictly defined criteria “that dis-
tinguish them from the normal run of 
the merely political”, to count as a 
security issue. “They have to be 
staged as existential threats to a refer-
ent object by a securitizing actor who 
thereby generates endorsement of 
emergency measures beyond rules 
that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 5). Their framework of analy-
sis is nevertheless criticised for being 
state-centred even though more sub-
tly (Hough 2004: 9). While accep-ting 
“the idea that non-military issues can 
be securitized and that the referent 
object of this can be something other 
than a state”, e.g. societies, the CS still 
sticks to the idea that it is mainly 
states which can be the securitizing 
actor (Hough 2004: 9) and the act of 
securing threatened people is still left 
to the state (Hough 2004: 17). 
Beside the Copenhagen School 
approach other security concepts 
emerged at the end of the 1980s up to 
the middle of the 1990s, which not 
only broadened and widened the in-
ternational security agenda but also 
deepened1 it. Maybe the most well-
                                                 
1  The perspective we take here is more 
simplistic than the one taken by the Critical 
Security Studies approach. When speaking 
about deepening we simply refer to the level of 
analysis. On the different notions of deepening 
see Booth 2005: 14, 15. 
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known approach of this generation is 
human security. The human security 
approach attempts to conceptualize 
the changing nature of security in two 
ways: 1) by complementing state se-
curity; 2) by emphasising and ad-
dressing the root causes for (human) 
insecurity when enhancing human 
rights and strengthening human de-
velopment (Glasius/Kaldor 2005: 66; 
Commission on Human Security 2003: 
2). Security threats should not only be 
dealt with by security policy and mili-
tary means, but comprehensively also 
by foreign and development policy 
and their respective policy tools. 
The human security approach 
stressed and accepted that e.g. ex-
treme economic and social distress, 
epidemics, the flow of refugees and 
trans-border migration, transnational 
terrorism, discrimination and violent 
repression by neo-patrimonial (au-
thoritarian) elites, the illegal trade of 
drugs and weapons are all a result or 
a root cause of insecurity for people in 
an interdependent world and that 
therefore a security approach which 
mainly focuses on state security might 
not be sufficient enough anymore. 
However, even more important was 
the evolving consciousness that situa-
tions far away demanded a policy 
response, as they also produced sig-
nificant effects in other states and 
among people living there. 
Precisely, to address the results  
but more importantly the root causes of 
insecurity in today’s world, the 
UNDP (1994) postulated a compre-
hensive conception of human secu-
rity. One might argue that the UNDP 
was at the forefront of postulating the 
human security approach, as they ex-
perienced firsthand the need to ac-
knowledge that human security, ei-
ther as a prerequisite for or as a neces-
sary accompaniment to human devel-
opment, is fundamentally pressing. 
Especially when working in post-
conflict situations, the link between 
(human) security and (human) devel-
opment becomes obvious. This also 
might explain why its concept ranges 
from a narrow Freedom from Fear per-
spective, which addresses threats to 
the physical and psychological integ-
rity of people, to a broad Freedom from 
Want perspective, which addresses 
threats to the socio-economic well-
being of people. 
Despite the astonishing atten-
tion in the academic and political 
sphere human security has gained, for 
now, a general accepted definition 
seems not to be on the horizon.2 In-
stead of proposing our own “working 
definition” of human security we try 
to demonstrate how an understand-
ing of human security as political 
leitmotif might serve as a reasonable 
interim solution helping to analyse 
the significance of human security on 
foreign policy agendas. 
 
                                                 
2  Maybe one of the most well-known 
definitions is the one proclaimed by the ICISS 
(2001: 15): “Human security means the security 
of people – their physical safety, their economic 
and social well-being, respect for their dignity 
and worth as human beings, and the protection 
of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (on different descriptions of human 
security see Alkire 2003). 
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Figure 1: The Horizontal and Vertical Security Agenda Extension
 
 
2. Concepts: Human Security as Political 
Leitmotif 
In this report the concept of 
human security as a political leitmotif 
(guiding vision) shines through all the 
various contributions (most clearly in  
Werthes/Bosold). But what exactly is 
meant when speaking of something as 
a political leitmotif? Political leitmo-
tifs do not image reality – neverthe-
less they might have analytical value. 
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In their contribution to this re-
port Werthes and Bosold describe po-
litical leitmotifs as “a conceptional 
theme, to a certain degree clearly de-
fined so as to retain its core identity if 
modified on subsequent appear-
ances”. Even more importantly, they 
can be described as a more or less co-
herent idea which shapes the attitude 
and performance of actors. They are 
despite a certain flexibility – or criti-
cally ambiguity – coherent patterns of 
thought. Thus, they help to formulate 
political agendas or to guide deci-
sions. When implementing policies 
they provide a relevant referential 
framework or an important bench-
mark. With regard to the aforemen-
tioned, political leitmotifs, as they 
contain to a great extent intuition and 
knowledge based on experience about 
what is and what should be possible, 
provide the basis for communication 
between political and administrative 
policy-makers, policy-orientated re-
searchers and an interested public. 
Political leitmotifs might get 
ahead and be especially helpful for 
managing situations of uncertainty 
and openness when they provide an 
opportunity for orientation; people 
can refer to these in cooperation and 
communication processes either by 
agreeing or by disagreeing (Dierkes et 
al. 1995: 12; Dierkes/Marz 1998: 16).3
Furthermore, whether they en-
joy success depends on their ability to 
meet certain demands with regard to 
new or outstanding challenges. Fol-
lowing the sociological research on 
guiding visions one can postulate that 
political leitmotifs have to fulfil at 
least three functions (see Dierkes et al. 
1995: 12-17): 
                                                 
3 In the following we adapt and modify ideas 
by Dierkes et al. 1995, which were originally 
developed for a social scientific engineering 
research context. 
1. Explanation and Orientation 
2. Coordination and action-
related decision guidance 
3. Motivation and mobilisation 
Elaborating on these functions 
we try to show how human security 
conceived as a political leitmotif de-
scribes ways to meet demands with 
regard to new and outstanding secu-
rity challenges. 
Explanation and Orientation: Af-
ter the end of the East-West conflict 
peace and security policy debates 
concentrated on the often violent 
transition of development and trans-
formation societies. Moreover, it be-
came apparent that the world is be-
coming increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent. Events in far-
away places could have a significant 
impact somewhere else. The “world” 
at the end of the 20th century was 
“willing” to deal more than ever with 
phenomena like transnational terror-
ism, internal conflicts, failing and 
failed states – to name only a few – 
and in addition has to deal with an 
evidently rising unilateralism of the 
last remaining superpower, the USA. 
Old guiding visions like real-
ism and traditional multilateralism 
seemed to be insufficient in giving 
answers and directives on how to un-
derstand, respond to or deal with 
these challenges. They seemed not to 
fit to the perceived complexity and 
interdependent interrelatedness 
which these challenges posed to the 
world as such. On the one hand guid-
ing visions or political leitmotifs have 
to be appropriate to these complexi-
ties without on the other hand being 
too restricted in terms of a necessary 
openness to abstractness and ambigu-
ous complexity. “Human security”, 
“world risk society” (Beck 1999), and 
“global neighbourhood” (Commis-
sion on Global Governance 1995) have 
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to prove that they perform better as 
accurate guiding visions.  
For now, one can argue that 
“human security” manages quite well 
to smartly integrate various trends 
and threats or the above-mentioned 
diffuse interrelated complexities. Be it 
the promising developments which 
evolve from the rapid and dynamic 
spread of human rights and democ-
racy, or the dynamic and barely as-
sessable developments in world econ-
omy, or – last but not least – the new 
security risks and threats originating 
in the transnationalising of organised 
crime and terrorism, or the increasing 
threat with regard to the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, 
global epidemics like HIV/AIDS, or 
global environmental problems, or 
massive migration processes, these 
conflict-laden processes associated 
with so-called globalisation and its 
“stepbrother” fragmentation can all 
be discussed with regard to their im-
plications for “human security”. 
Particularly the UNDP, in its 
1994 report, illustrates how human 
security might serve the function of 
explanation and orientation when it 
concludes that the main factors and 
root causes of violence and disrupted 
development processes can only be 
dealt with by a people-centred ap-
proach focussing on seven security 
dimensions: economic, food, health, 
environmental, personal, community, 
and political security. And by naming 
these dimensions of human security 
they make them valid benchmarks for 
a human security framework. 
Coordination and action-related 
decision guidance: The above explained 
explanation/orientation function of 
political leitmotifs would be of limited 
use if they did not likewise help to 
coordinate policy conduct and serve 
as action-related decision guidance. In 
addition to a ability to recognize, sys-
temise and interpret changes and 
challenges in the world they should 
facilitate and coordinate goal-oriented 
action by establishing valid check 
marks. 
Human security clearly leans 
on a conception of an international 
norms-oriented effective multilateral-
ism. When guiding the analysis of 
multidimensional new security 
threats and the formulation of policies 
concerning these matters, it obviously 
supports the engagement of various 
state, non-state, and multilateral ac-
tors. 
A prominent example of how 
human security as political leitmotif 
functions well as a valid benchmark 
and policy framework for collective 
action-oriented peace and security 
policies might be the Human Security 
Network (HSN)4. For now, one can 
carefully agree with the self-ascribed 
description that the “Network plays a 
catalytic role by bringing international 
attention to new and emerging is-
sues”. Furthermore, it is stated that 
this is made possible by “applying a 
human security perspective to inter-
national problems”, where “the Net-
work aims to energize political proc-
esses aimed at preventing or solving 
conflicts and promoting peace and 
development” 
                                                 
4  “The Network's current efforts to achieve 
greater human security include issues such as 
the universalization of the Ottawa Convention 
on Anti-personnel Landmines, the 
establishment of the International Criminal 
Court, the protection of children in armed 
conflict, the control of small arms and light 
weapons, the fight against trans-national 
organized crime, human development and 
human security, human rights education, the 
struggle against HIV/AIDS, addressing 
implementation gaps of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, and 
conflict prevention” (http://www.humansec 
uritynetwork.org/network-e.php). 
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(http://www.humansecuritynetwork.o
rg/network-e.php). Under the guiding 
vision of human security the network 
pursues security policies that focus on 
the protection and security require-
ment of the individual and society by 
promoting freedom from fear and 
freedom from want. This means, in 
concrete terms, protecting and pro-
moting human rights, the rule of law, 
democratic governance and democ-
ratic structures, a culture of peace and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
Motivation and mobilisation: 
Nevertheless, political leitmotifs 
would stay politically inoperative if 
they did not – in addition to explana-
tion/orientation and coordination/ 
action-oriented guidance – help to 
significantly fulfil a third function. 
This is to motivate and mobilise con-
cerned actors. And with regard to so-
ciological and social-psychological 
findings, that is best guaranteed when 
leitmotifs stimulate not only the cog-
nitive potentials of humans but also 
their emotional and affective person-
ality as such (Dierkes et al. 1995: 15-
16). This explains to a certain degree 
why discourses about leitmotifs and 
existing alternatives are sometimes – 
due to the fact that they are closely 
interrelated with norms, values and 
ideals – conducted in such a vehe-
ment manner (Dierkes et al. 1995: 17). 
Security policy oriented leitmo-
tifs most notably perform this motiva-
tion and mobilising function when 
they either serve as a positive and 
open integrative or a negative-
segregative identification model. 
Nevertheless, in both ways facilitating 
and stimulating the coordination of 
collectives. 
“Negative” Leitmotifs which 
produce concepts of “the other” 
stimulate social-psychological mecha-
nisms of inclusion and exclusion, of 
in-group and out-group formation. 
Certain negative aspects of behaviour 
shape the concept of the enemy 
(Feindbild - foe image/bogeyman im-
age). Other aspects or even change in 
behaviour or attitude, which might be 
associated with a willingness to coop-
erate or as confidence-building meas-
ures, will then be ignored, devalu-
ated, or interpreted as cheap tricks. 
In contrast, multilateralists tend 
towards leitmotifs which create posi-
tive integrative possibilities for identi-
fication. Both the guiding vision of a 
"global neighbourhood" of the Com-
mission on Global Governance (1995) 
and the UNDP-proclaimed leitmotif 
of “human security” take accurate 
aim at reducing the spatial and emo-
tional distance when appealing to (in-
ternational) solidarity and compas-
sion. The evolving comprehension of 
complex patterns, relationships, and 
interdependencies in wars/internal 
conflicts or situations of underdevel-
opment is evoked by reasoning with 
analogies: the well-known action-
oriented contexts of e.g. every indi-
vidual’s own neighbour-hood or eve-
ryday life experience with regard to 
similar needs, worries, and fears is 
designed to foster empathy and un-
derstanding. And this, together with 
the underlined notion and compre-
hension of proximity and transna-
tional interrelatedness of situations 
here and there, motivates and mobi-
lises. 
Whether leitmotifs like these 
are able to motivate and mobilise not 
only a critical public but also political 
decision-makers remains an open 
question. Nevertheless, the UNDP has 
surely proven that human security 
inside the UN system and with regard 
to world conferences already has a 
certain motivating and mobilising 
impact. Furthermore, when looking at 
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middle powers like Canada and Ja-
pan, or at the members of the HSN, or 
latterly at the EU, one can observe 
that the leitmotif of human security  
has the potential to motivate and mo-
bilize collective reflections and per-
haps also collective action in the 
world of states. 
 
 
3. Cases: Human Security on Selected Foreign 
Policy Agendas 
Human security concepts vary 
widely, as the various case studies in 
this report illustrate. For example, the 
Canadian and Norwegian govern-
ment and to a certain degree the HSN 
focus on a narrow conception of hu-
man security, mainly addressing 
‘Freedom from fear’ aspects, that is 
physical violence, especially in violent 
conflicts. Accordingly, under certain 
well-defined circumstances interven-
tions in the internal affairs of a sover-
eign state can be legitimised. Put dif-
ferently, it is argued that in cases of 
imminent direct threats to the sur-
vival of people, as in Rwanda in 1994, 
the international community has to 
fulfil its responsibility to protect and 
act respectively. Furthermore, the nar-
row approach focuses for example on 
the banning of anti-personnel land-
mines, the establishment of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, and the 
stopping of the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons in conflict 
zones. 
Sascha Werthes and David Bosold 
refer to the goal of the HSN to stop 
the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons in conflict zones in 
their case study. By juxtaposing rhe-
torical claims/pretension and actual 
political action with regard to policy 
dynamics, they critically assess the 
potential and limits of political leitmo-
tifs in general and of human security 
in concrete terms. They argue that an 
analysis which emphasises the role of 
language is well-suited to yield addi-
tional insights in order to come to 
grips with the fluidity of political 
leitmotifs such as e.g. human security. 
Moreover, they illustrate that political 
leitmotifs can successfully include 
ethical dimensions. The advantage of 
human security as a political leitmotif 
is, then, that the ethical/normative 
dimensions do not refer to the state 
but rather focus on the individual, 
thereby allowing a broader variety of 
actors to commit themselves to this 
specific goal. Furthermore, because 
the leitmotif is so flexible and multi-
faceted it represents a window of op-
portunity for like-minded countries 
and actors to work on at least certain 
issues of human security by contribut-
ing resources and expertise in fields of 
paramount importance to them. 
Therefore, overemphasizing the short-
comings of leitmotifs means to under-
estimate their potential, which exactly 
relies on its ambiguity/ flexibility 
(similar but more critically with re-
gard to the ambiguity aspect Paris 
2001). 
As pointed out, the broad con-
ception of human security emphasises 
that the security and well-being of in-
dividuals has an effect on the security 
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and well-being of other individuals. 
For example, extreme poverty might 
lead to crime or migration, or more 
drastically to trans-border criminal 
networks engaging in human, arms, 
and drug trafficking. The incapability 
of one state to deal with the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, SARS, or Dengue fever 
might lead in a globalized world to an 
increased spread of the epidemic in 
the whole world, threatening the sur-
vival and well-being of individuals 
everywhere. This broad approach, 
emphasised e.g. by UNDP and the 
Japanese government, no longer al-
lows for a clear-cut juxtaposition of 
(human) security and (human) devel-
opment policies, as it not only ad-
dresses threats to the survival but also 
to the well-being of the people. It 
therefore demands a policy of protec-
tion and empowerment (Com-mission 
on Human Security 2003). 
Japan stands as the perfect ex-
ample for having this broad concep-
tion of human security on the foreign 
policy agenda. Elena Atanassova-
Cornelis therefore analyses Japan’s 
path to human security, the introduc-
tion and definition of the leitmotif in 
the Japanese context, and Japan’s con-
crete initiatives for its implementa-
tion. The paper demonstrates that 
both the conceptualisation and the 
practical implementation of this no-
tion by Japan reflect the Japanese his-
torical and normative background, 
and the country’s particular prefer-
ence for non-military and human-
centred foreign policy. Thus, this pa-
per argues that instead of trying to 
make human security a coherent con-
cept, scholars should accept its multi-
faceted nature. Hence, it should be 
analysed from the perspective of dif-
ferent actors, whose approaches to the 
‘leitmotif’ may be an expression of 
actors’ specific backgrounds and pol-
icy preferences. A deeper understand-
ing of why human security is attrac-
tive to different actors and why they 
emphasise different variants or priori-
ties, might allow scholars to point out 
where the chances for joint policy pro-
jects are highest. Moreover, this gives 
preliminary answers to the question 
why certain political leitmotifs gain 
more attention or are more attractive 
than others. 
Atanassova-Cornelis illustrates 
in great detail how human security 
has become for Japan an instrument 
for foreign policy actions in line with 
the country’s historical context and 
international behaviour after World 
War II. Explicitly accentuating the 
changing nature of security, the Japa-
nese approach places particular em-
phasis on human needs and human 
development, which is materialised in 
practice through its ODA policy. Hu-
man security, in the Japanese case, 
reflects the values of its society as it is 
dedicated to peace and permeated by 
anti-militarism, and strongly opposed 
to coercive means, such as the use of 
force. Yet the Japanese approach also 
stresses the need to prevent conflicts 
and to deal with their consequences 
for humans. Against this background, 
human security is a rather natural 
extension of Japan’s non-military se-
curity agenda, as well as a possibility 
for Japanese policy-makers to increase 
the country’s role in international 
peace and security. 
The extent to which human se-
curity as a political leitmotif can be 
incorporated in the European concep-
tualisation of security, as well as the 
extent to which it is increasingly be-
coming a point of reference, and ful-
fils a function of orientation, is ex-
plored by Ruby Gropas. Her twofold 
approach on the one hand exemplifies 
(in a similar manner to Atanassova-
Cornelis) how human security is 
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linked to Europe’s historical and 
normative background with regard to 
the special emphasis human rights 
have in Europe. And on the other 
hand, she suggests that EU institu-
tions can have an instrumental role in 
enabling Member States to adopt 
common positions that pro-mote the 
respect of human rights by providing 
narratives of mutual identification of 
what constitutes a threat to their secu-
rity and of the means through which 
to address current challenges. 
Gropas convincingly argues 
that should human security become 
an orientation for a “European” for-
eign policy, it has to be in line with 
the EU’s understanding of human 
rights and it should adhere to the 
EU’s tradition of fostering projects of 
multilateralism and of promoting a 
rule-based international order. She 
argues that the further underpinning 
of the European Security Strategy 
with the proposed Human Security 
Doctrine would widen the scope for 
cultivating the respect and the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms while addressing global and 
regional security challenges. 
P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen go 
one step further when analysing the 
manner in which the publication of 
the ‘European Security Strategy’ in 
2003 and ‘A Human Security Doctrine 
for Europe’ in 2004 has proposed a 
shift in the focus of EU’s security 
mandate from the sovereign rights of  
nation-states to the protection of indi-
vidual citizens. They show how the 
European security strategy stands in 
notable contrast to the September 17, 
2002 ‘National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America’. Their 
analysis gives first insights on the 
possible strategy in which the EU will 
use human security as a political leit-
motif to coordinate its foreign and 
security policy action and how it 
functions as action-related guidance 
for decisions. They conclude that 
while it is only a preliminary and still 
problematic strategy, the EU has 
taken a significant first step towards 
conceptualizing the matching of its 
force capability with the reality of 
contemporary human insecurity. 
Liotta/Owen point out where 
the limits and pitfalls of these new 
developments lie. For now it remains 
unclear, for example, how the EU will 
truly broaden its capabilities to re-
spond with an overarching human 
security policy – other than simply 
addressing the necessity to act. For 
there is still a long way to go for the 
EU to be ready to intervene when 
necessary, and to have the organiza-
tion and structure to do it. Equally 
challenging is the complexity of find-
ing decisions for organizing the com-
mon budget with regard to long-term 
investment and planning. Neverthe-
less, Liotta/Owen emphasise and il-
lustrate that at least a constructive 
and interesting dialogue has begun. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The security landscape has 
changed and, as we have pointed out 
and the papers will in more detail, the 
old security concepts are no longer 
adequate for coping with the “new” 
security threats in an interdependent 
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world. In contrast, the concept of hu-
man security is increasingly shaping 
foreign policy agendas. 
Human security helps – how-
ever vaguely – with the conceptuali-
sation of the broad range of currently 
perceived threats. More-over, it offers 
a normative reference point for evalu-
ating and orientating policies and po-
litical instruments: the security and 
protection of the individual. It thereby 
demands creativity and flexibility 
when deciding on policy strategies 
and policy instruments. 
Especially with regard to policy 
strategies and policy instruments, the 
“flexibility” of human security allows 
the various actors on the one hand to 
give the approach their own flavour 
and on the other hand to offer the 
chance for concerted policy projects. 
Japan, as is pointed out by Atanass-
ova-Cornelis, addresses human secu-
rity from a human needs oriented 
perspective, which makes it not al-
ways easy to differentiate this from a 
human development policy, but 
which is therefore coherent and com-
patible with Japanese’ post-World 
War II foreign policy tradition. In line 
with her, Gropas argues that the 
strength of human security lies in its 
capability to be linked with a specific 
country’s (or actor’s) tradition, per-
ception of the world, or simply with 
certain policy priorities. With regard 
to the EU, she points out the linkages 
between human security and human 
rights therefore, arguing convincingly 
that a European human security con-
cept, in contrast to a Japanese one, 
should be focussed on human rights. 
Liotta/Owen likewise take  a close  
 
look at the EU, but while also seeing a 
shift in the focus of EU’s security con-
cept from the sovereign rights of na-
tion-states to the protection of indi-
vidual citizens, they remain to a cer-
tain degree sceptical about the veloc-
ity with which the EU can live up to 
its own ideas which are being devel-
oped at the present. This is exactly 
what Werthes and Bosold do in their 
case study. After having explicated 
how comprehending human security 
as a political leitmotif might help to 
understand why in the case of the 
Human Security Network various 
states work together, they look into 
how far their claims really produce 
substantive results. 
In sum, Canada and Japan have 
proven already that human security, 
despite its current definitional ambi-
guity, can serve as a political leitmotif, 
and helps to formulate policy agendas 
leading to substantial results (e.g. the 
Ottawa Process and the establishment 
of the ICC). In the case of the EU, the 
papers show that despite being an 
element in an orientation process of 
the EU’s foreign and security policy, it 
remains an open question whether 
human security as a political leitmotif 
will also serve the other functions. 
The flexibility and fluidity of the hu-
man security leitmotif, sure enough, 
allow different (international) actors 
to focus on and prioritise different 
aspects of today’s and tomorrow’s 
insecurities. This additionally and 
advantageously might permit collabo-
rative efforts of various inter-national 
actors, as long as political inventive-
ness is maintained (Bosold/Werthes 
2005: 101).  
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Caught between Pretension and 
Substantiveness – Ambiguities of Human 
Security as a Political Leitmotif 
Sascha Werthes/David Bosold 
 
 
Despite (or because of) the 
term’s vagueness and lack of analyti-
cal clarity (Paris 2001, Newman 2004) 
the human security concept has at-
tracted considerable attention, both in 
academia and politics. Most research-
ers have focussed on human security 
as a broadened and/or deepened type 
of traditional security policy, implicat-
ing a shift of or adding of referent 
objects (the state, societal groups, 
individuals, the environment), modes 
of prioritisation and the relation of 
national and human security, to name 
only a few (Burgess et al. 2004). Most 
academics regard efforts for human 
security as difficult within the existing 
order of states, whose scopes of action 
are legally ‘protected’ by international 
law due to the norm of national sov-
ereignty.1 Scholars have not yet come 
to grips with this dialectical relation 
of national and human security, as the 
former represents both a cause and a 
prerequisite for the latter. 
Some of these criticisms are in-
deed to a certain extent justified, 
                                                 
                                                
1  The main argument goes that “some states 
are unable or are unwilling to provide security 
for their citizens” (Bain 2001: 279) and that the 
international norm of non-intervention more 
often proves to be a cause of human insecurity 
rather than the prerequisite for human security, 
see the report of International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). 
For the academic IR-debate see e.g. Security 
Dialogue with contributions of Thomas/Tow 
(2002a, 2002b), Bellamy/McDonald (2002), 
Liotta (2002a, 2002b), Smith-Windsor (2002), 
Grayson (2003); a very good overview is pro-
vided by Kerr (2003). 
though most of the debates have con-
centrated on aspects we regard as 
neither relevant for policy-makers, 
who use the term frequently, nor 
fruitful – as it is “over-theorised” – in 
terms of academic research. The latter 
aspect refers to debates in academic 
journals which call for a precise defi-
nition of “human security” (see e.g. 
Security Dialogue 2004), arguing that 
this will solve the problem of ambigu-
ity and make it possible for policy-
makers to act in clearly defined proc-
esses within specific sectors to realise 
the goal of a human security centred 
policy (see also Werthes/Debiel in this 
report). 
While these criticisms allow for 
a critical evaluation of ‘human secu-
rity’ as a coherent political concept, we 
might ask ourselves if such an under-
taking is relevant for the reality of 
politics and policies. That is, whether 
a political concept can be coherent per 
se, with a clear underlying ‘logic of 
action’ that leads to clearly defined 
agendas, political processes and re-
sults. When the Japanese and the Ca-
nadian government have a different 
understanding of human security2 – 
 
2  Canada’s definition of human security did 
not include anti-personnel landmines as a 
human security issue in policy documents and 
speeches in 1995, but rather declared it an issue 
of disarmament (Canada 1995). From the be-
ginning of the “Ottawa-Process” in 1996, 
though, banning anti-personnel landmines 
became the human security issue per se (Ax-
worthy 1996a, 1996b, Axworthy/Taylor 1998, 
DFAIT 1999). 
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not to mention other actors, be it aca-
demic or governmental – it becomes 
clear that “fixing” the meaning of 
human security becomes a strikingly 
arbitrary undertaking, since its mean-
ing is subject to the affirmation and 
contestation of others and, moreover, 
embedded in a varying contextual 
and temporal setting. Put differently: 
human security is an amorphous term 
that is in constant flux. Firstly, be-
cause different actors have different 
understandings of the notion. Sec-
ondly, because the meaning is recon-
structed and changes through future 
events that cannot be foreseen. 
 
 
1.  Human Security as Political Leitmotif and 
Language Game 
In general, the concept of a 
leitmotif (leading motif) can be under-
stood as a conceptional theme, to a 
certain degree clearly defined so as to 
retain its core identity if modified on 
subsequent appearances. That is, hu-
man security when conceived as a po-
litical leitmotif can be understood as a 
more or less coherent normative 
framework for foreign policy. Basi-
cally, we argue that when enhancing 
human security is the self-ascribed (by 
relevant politicians or by the govern-
ment) political leitmotif of a specific 
country (e.g. the member states of the 
Human Security Network, HSN), its 
impact should be significant not only 
in formulating specific policies but 
also in pursuing these policies. Like a 
normative and practical compass it 
might then help to orientate, to coor-
dinate, and to motivate a country’s 
policy (see Werthes/Debiel in this 
report). Eventually, it will help to 
decide what kind of policies can be 
legitimized. When an idea is broadly 
accepted as the political leitmotif, it 
should determine relevant policy 
processes. Moreover, when it is clari-
fied or substantiated in empirical 
observable goals (like e.g. reducing 
the threat of small arms and light 
weapons) one can postulate that it 
serves as a valid benchmark for ana-
lysing policies – thereby, juxtaposing 
pretension (that is the rhetorical 
‘speech act’) and substantiveness (the 
means and political action). 
Put differently: language is a 
fundamental part of our daily life – 
obviously – and therefore of political 
life, too. Especially, when it comes to 
political leitmotifs, such as human 
security, the advantages of an ap-
proach that takes into account the 
performative power of these notions 
become obvious (Gould 2003, see also 
Fierke 2003: 71ff., Fierke 1998). One 
should therefore perceive human 
security as a political leitmotif and a 
language game which entails specific 
rules (see Fierke 1998). 
Onuf’s (1989) seminal work on 
the construction of rules through so-
cial interaction, and thus language, 
therefore becomes very fruitful for an 
analysis. If the human security dis-
course is understood as a discourse 
that tries to establish specific rules of 
the game and, therefore, predefined 
sets of meaning, the concretion of 
human security by governments en-
tails consequences that these may not 
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have completely understood. Most 
governments – one might argue – 
understand human security as a holis-
tic concept, thus relating different 
aspects of policy that were hitherto 
perceived unrelated. In addition, it is 
seen as a normative concept. Both as-
pects have practical consequences. For 
example, if government A declares 
that in order to improve the level of 
human security its foreign policy has 
to deal with issues B, C and D at the 
same time and that this action has to 
be done coherently, political processes 
are expected to change. If the Cana-
dian government intends to improve 
human security for the people in Af-
ghanistan it might pursue a foreign 
policy through demining (a compo-
nent normally undertaken by the mili-
tary), prosecution of war criminals 
(e.g. through a ruling of the ICC) and 
human rights promo-
tion/democratization (through the  
work of officials of the foreign minis-
try or the Canadian International De-
velopment Agency). When other gov-
ernments commit themselves to one 
or more of these tasks the chances for 
concerted foreign policy projects have 
been established, no matter if they 
also have committed themselves to 
the political leitmotif. 
Nevertheless, a transparent, 
while still flexible leitmotif like hu-
man security further enhances the 
chances for concerted policy projects, 
par excellence exemplified in the HSN, 
which, basically speaking, tries to 
push forward concerted policy pro-
jects. That is, foreign policy becomes 
concerted in being oriented towards a 
pre-established aim – here, a some-
how defined improvement of human 
security – and the subjugation of all 
activities of the different ministries 
and governments to achieve that goal. 
 
 
2.  The Political Consequences of a Human 
Security Policy 
While the iteration of different 
standards and premises of human 
security not only define the nature of 
human security, and, therefore the 
ends, it also defines the means or, at 
least, the legitimacy of these means. 
When governments are hence pursu-
ing a normative (or ethical) coherent 
foreign policy for achieving human 
security, they rhetorically predispose 
strategies and instruments for its re-
alization, while excluding other 
choices. 
That is, human security as a po-
litical leitmotif might help politicians  
to formulate and legitimize certain 
policies and concrete policy goals. 
When, as is done frequently, these 
policy goals are substantiated in terms 
of empirical observable goals, one can 
test if a certain policy is able to realize 
this goal. In addition, and more inter-
estingly, when the policy is attached 
to an overarching leitmotif, one can 
include the broader policy context. 
That is, one can postulate that the 
respective government tries to make 
sure that other policies do not run 
counter to the self-ascribed political 
leitmotif and the substantiated policy 
goals. 
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In order to evaluate the ethical 
rhetoric of politicians the context of a 
specific moral/ethical foreign policy 
identity needs to be highlighted. Care-
fully(!) argued, the ‘way of acting’ to-
wards objects can reveal the ethical 
dimension of a country’s (foreign) 
policy which creates a form of politi-
cal identity, a foreign policy identity 
(see Mutimer 2000). Thus, for exam-
ple, acting towards objects which 
constitute sources or forms of insecu-
rity (landmines, small arms) can cre-
ate a form of political identity. Fur-
thermore, by invoking an ethical 
rhetoric one’s own identity becomes 
stabilised and – in assuming that oth-
ers' behaviour is not in compliance 
with one's own – legitimised. Thus, it 
is through a process of naming certain 
criteria to be legitimate that moral 
superiority is taken for granted. How-
ever, this also allows for a meticulous 
taking stock of whether one lives up 
to its promises or pretensions. 
In sum, one can conceive hu-
man security as a leitmotif shaping 
the foreign policy identity of specific 
actors which ascribe it to themselves 
(e.g. the members of the HSN). How-
ever, this alone only allows for the 
description of one certain foreign pol- 
 
icy. What it does not do is to provide 
a framework or guideline for evalua-
tion. An evaluation only becomes 
possible because in our case a human 
security policy is presented as a mor-
ally superior and ethical foreign pol-
icy. Since this ethical dimension is 
used to discredit specific forms of 
conduct of political action it can there-
fore be used to analyse the credibility 
and coherence of those who claim 
their righteousness. 
In the next chapters we will 
look more closely at Canada, Norway, 
Switzerland, and Austria, which are 
all members of the HSN and addi-
tionally significant producers and 
traders of small arms and light weap-
ons. A closer look is interesting as the 
HSN has put itself at the forefront of 
regulating supply, reducing demand, 
and ending misuse of small arms, as 
one way of working for the “human 
security vision”. Moreover, a closer 
look might reveal whether the reiter-
ated criticism that human security has 
either been used to conceal real inter-
ests under the cover of a foreign pol-
icy “with a human face” (Neufeld 
2002) or been implemented to do for-
eign policy on the cheap (Nossal 1999) 
can be supported. 
 
 
3.  Human Security, Ethics, and the National 
Interest 
A human security based for-
eign policy agenda has most promi-
nently been pushed forward by Can-
ada and Japan but also by the coun-
tries which are members of the HSN3 
                                                 
                                                         
3  The Human Security currently has 13 
members: Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, 
(Bosold/Werthes 2005). Here, much 
attention has been devoted to the 
question of how far human security 
 
Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, 
Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, 
South Africa (observer), see 
<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>. 
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can be related to (or differentiated 
from) human and sustainable devel-
opment, human rights or multifaceted 
peace-building activities (Nef 1999, 
Ramcharan 2002, Bastian 2004, New-
man/Richmond 2001). In addition, 
discussions have focussed on these 
countries’ conceptualisations of hu-
man security as freedom from fear (that 
is, mainly, protection from physical 
violence) and/or freedom from want 
(that is, empowerment and the supply 
of basic human needs). 
 
Figure 1: The Range of Human Security Concepts 
 
In that sense, a lot of energy has 
been devoted to analysing the specific 
character of human security. A review 
of the existing literature reveals a 
certain naïveté, because most authors 
have underestimated the fluidity of 
the concept and the fact that these 
governments have continuously 
changed their human security agenda. 
While it is impossible (and in our case 
of negligible importance) to retrace 
the reasons for this, be it domestic 
pressure, the changing international 
environment or shifting alliances, it 
has to be stressed time and again that 
human security is not a fixed foreign 
policy agenda, instrument or process 
whatsoever. It is, like other political 
terms, exposed to continuous (re-
)interpretation, (re-)construction and 
contestation, and only comprehensi-
ble in its (temporal and cultural) con-
text. Although the study of the differ-
ent national and global human secu-
rity discourses is potentially fruitful, 
our interest in this paper is more 
straightforward and empirically 
grounded. 
Despite textual changes in dif-
ferent human security agendas, one 
can discern a core, that is, some key 
characteristics, which remain un-
changed. As we have argued else-
where (Bosold/Werthes 2005: 99), 
these include the following:  
a) The object of security is not lim-
ited to the state but also in-
cludes the individual. 
b) People should have the oppor-
tunity to live decently and 
without threats to their sur-
vival. 
c) Safety threats must be ad-
dressed through multilateral 
processes and 
d) by taking into account the pat-
terns of interdependence that 
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characterize the globalized 
world in which we are living. 
These four characteristics will 
allow for an evaluation of the seem-
ingly diametrically opposed spheres 
of national interests and ethics. 
What has come to be under-
stood as normative or ethical foreign 
policy has been analysed with much 
scrutiny over the last decade. How-
ever, there has remained considerable 
divergence on the analysis of that 
trend. Most scholars agree that a 
“rhetoric turn” has taken place in 
foreign policy, especially in the offi-
cial (re)presentation of foreign policy 
by political figures in speeches, news-
paper comments, etc. (Chandler 2003, 
Dunne/Wheeler 2001, 1998, Brown 
2001, Irwin 2001, Gelb/Rosenthal 2003, 
Toje 2002). One might argue that hu-
man rights and, nowadays, human 
security have become starting points 
for an ethical foreign policy orienta-
tion. Whereas human rights or human 
rights abuses are common rhetorical 
figures in the debates on a new inter-
ventionism, human security is dis-
cussed as a benchmark for global 
security and a point of reference for 
global action.4 One example is given 
by the justification of NATO’s air 
raids in Kosovo 1999 by then Cana-
dian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy 
(bold parts: emphasis added): 
“Kosovo is a good illustration of the hu-
man security crisis that the world is fac-
ing at the end of this century, […] At its 
core, the human security agenda is an 
effort to construct a global society in 
which the safety of people is an interna-
tional priority and a motivating force 
for international action; where interna-
tional humanitarian standards and the 
rule of law are advanced and woven into 
a coherent web protecting the individual. 
                                                 
                                                
4  Although it is not always easy to estimate 
when these terms might be simply instrumen-
talized as smoke screens for purely interest- 
driven policies. 
[…] What this means for us is that hu-
man security is not just a foreign policy 
idea, but a political imperative, placed 
on all our agendas by the weight of 
public opinion. Nothing has reinforced 
public support for Canada's policy on 
Kosovo more than the anguished faces of 
refugees flowing across Kosovo's bor-
ders. The citizens of the countries around 
this table are largely unaffected by these 
threats, but human security stands for 
the values they share. […] None of us 
around the NATO table saw, or sees, any 
strategic advantage to intervening in 
Kosovo. No oil or other vital minerals are 
at stake.” (Axworthy 1999)5. 
This statement exemplifies how 
human security as a political leitmotif 
brings together various elements of 
government policy (defence, trade, 
development, aid, peacebuilding, etc.) 
under one common foreign policy 
mandate. Even more interestingly, as 
the statement of Axworthy shows, 
human security fosters serious en-
gagement for people not living inside 
the respective national borders in 
cases where no strategic (realpolitical) 
interests are at stake. Put differently, 
the security of people, inside or out-
side of a country’s borders is made 
the primary object to protect, because 
it is a moral and ethical obligation. 
Implicit in these statements is the 
assumption that a human security 
foreign policy is better equipped to 
address current international chal-
lenges as it links internal situations to 
global security. It is not only the in-
terdependence of states which is em-
phasized but also the notion of the 
interdependence of the situation of 
people all over the world which is 
emphasized. This is exaggerated, 
when saying that “Human Security 
has become both a new measure of 
 
5  The arguments can also be found in Axwor-
thy 2003, 2004. For a more general stance on the 
primacy of ethical concerns within a human 
security framework see also Vollebæk 1999, 
Johnson 1999, Kalista 2000, de Hoop Scheffer 
2002, Swiss Delegation 2004, HSN 1999. 
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global security and a new agenda for 
global action” (HSN 1999). That is not 
to say that (normative) political leit-
motifs are per se immune of any hy-
pocrisy, but as they put various ele-
ments of government policy under 
one leading prioritized motif they 
might make hypocrisy strikingly ob-
vious and easier to illustrate. 
Thus, what has remained con-
tested since is the question whether 
the invocation of ethical concerns has 
had an impact on foreign policy in the 
sense that there are now ethical objec-
tions against some means of foreign 
policy or whether ethical concerns are 
used as an instrument to conceal other 
interests (Grayson 2004). Further-
more, the question has been raised to 
what extent ethics and interests can be 
reconciled (Brown 2001: 21-22). Brown 
notes that due to the multidimen-
sional character of foreign policy an 
exclusive promotion of one particular 
aspect, e.g. human rights, is not feasi-
ble (Ibid.: 29). Notwithstanding this, 
he argues that sometimes actors stress 
a strictly one-dimensional perception 
of aspects in order to engage in dia-
logue (Ibid.: 30). In this way the dan-
ger that ethical discourses of govern-
ments represent sheer monologues is 
countered. This is an aspect which 
Karen Fierke – in the very same vol-
ume – describes as a critical mirror. 
She argues that “the explicit articula-
tion of an ethical foreign is a positive 
development, so long as it increases 
the potential for holding the govern-
ment accountable for its promises” 
(Fierke 2001: 143). However, there is 
some danger that the moral dimen-
sion of the policy may be used to 
build support for actions that might 
otherwise be questioned. She argues 
that a “foreign policy that is ethical in 
practice requires that individuals and 
groups be ready to hold up a critical 
mirror to government action.” Basi-
cally, this means that “the explicit 
articulation of an ethical foreign pol-
icy has provided a framework for 
others to make a comparison between 
policy and implementation” (Fierke 
2001: 143-144). Individuals and 
groups ready to hold up a critical 
mirror to government action can best 
be found in democracies. 
When an ethical foreign policy 
in a democratic society is tied to the 
consent of the citizenry, public opin-
ion plays an important role. There-
fore, a human security policy seems to 
be in perfect resonance with the si-
multaneous demands of Western 
populations in pursuing an ethically 
responsible, issue-based foreign pol-
icy while simultaneously trying to 
push forward one’s own interests. 
Recent findings of opinion polls actu-
ally complement the functionalistic 
argument that a human security pol-
icy may not only be able to make for-
eign policy more coherent but suggest 
that a government can thereby also 
increase the support for its (foreign) 
policy. As a recent study (November 
2004) shows, Canadians interestingly 
supported two out of six different 
concepts overwhelmingly.6 One of 
these was the approach, supported by 
three out of four Canadians, relating 
to the statement “given how impor-
tant trade is to Canada’s economy, 
protecting our trade relationships 
should be our top our foreign policy 
priority”. The other was the procla-
mation: “Canada should focus its 
international efforts on working with 
non-governmental organizations to 
build support for specific solutions to 
                                                 
6  Briefly summed up: 1) Why not be Switzer-
land; 2) Foreign Policy as Canada – U.S. rela-
tions; 3) Foreign Policy as a trade policy; 4) 
Reviving the Glory Days?; 5) Canada the New 
Norway; 6) A Foreign Policy of “Soft” Power. 
For a detailed discussion and explanation see 
Innovative Research Group 2004. 
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key problems, like the ban on land-
mines, and not try and do so many 
other things”, an opinion held by 69% 
of Canadians (Innovative Research 
Group 2004: 20-22).  
Not really surprisingly but in-
terestingly, it is that same ambiva-
lence of public opinion which can 
now also be found in governmental 
documents and speeches. It is note-
worthy that the vision statement most 
heavily rejected (by 81%) was “we 
should spend what it takes to be the 
international power we used to be,  
even if it means doing without things 
we would like in areas like health and 
education”. 
We will now seek to “mirror” 
the HSN’s agenda in order to hint at 
some of the inconsistencies in the 
countries’ foreign policies. Nonethe-
less, we argue, in accordance with 
Brown, that the overall thrust of the 
agenda by the HSN has resulted in 
processes and developments which 
bring claims/pretension and substan-




4.  A Case in Study: The HSN’s Agenda on 
Small Arms 
Small Arms have been placed 
high on the agenda, and the issue 
seemed to be destined for realising 
the initial idea of the HSN, that is, 
repeating the success of the Ottawa 
process (HSN 2005b, Axworthy 2001). 
The official will of the member states 
to find ways to eradicate the illicit 
trade in SALWs was documented in a 
series of statements which have been 
issued since 1999 (HSN 2000, HSN 
2003, HSN 2004). One statement 
which is exemplary for these is that 
made in May 2005 at the 7th Ministe-
rial meeting in Ottawa, saying that 
“the threats posed by small arms, 
light weapons, and ammunition must 
be addressed with a people-centred 
approach” (HSN 2005a, also see the 
speeches by Swiss, Austrian and 
Norwegian officials Maurer 2005, 
Köffler 2004, Vollebæk 1999). 
It is interesting that all state-
ments explicitly call for a better con-
trol of illicit trade in SALWs, and not 
for a reduction in the general trade of 
or the production of small arms. Yet 
there are some analogies between the 
efforts to ban landmines and those 
dealing with the issue of SALW – one 
being Axworthy (2003: 345) saying 
that “when the Ottawa land-mines 
conference came to an end, several 
participants asked whether this kind 
of process could secure a treaty for the 
control of small arms. It seemed a 
natural fit, so I asked my officials to 
develop a strategy”. If that were com-
pletely the case, however, a complete 
stop on the production of SALWs or 
at least export of those weapons 
would have to be implemented. Ob-
viously, this is a naïve and unrealistic 
assumption, given the fact, that in 
proportion – in contrast to landmines 
– Switzerland, Austria, Norway and 
Canada are significant producers and 
exporters of SALW (Austria and Can-
ada being in the top 10 of exporting 
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countries worldwide, Norwegian 
Church Aid 2005: 52). 
 
Table 1:  Exporters of Firearms and Ammunition in 2001 and selected data from the Small 
Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2005* (based on 2002 customs data from UN Comtrade) 





(20 points max) 
Information 
on deliveries*
(4 points max) 
Information on 
licences granted* 
(4 points max) 
1. USA 741 16 4 4 
2. Italy 299 12.5 3 2 
3. Belgium 234 6.5 2 0 
4. Germany 157 15.5 2 4 
5. Brazil 100 7.5 2 0 
6. Austria 78 6.5 2 0 
7. Japan 70 7.5 2 0 
8. Spain 65 11.5 2.5 1 
9. Canada 54 12 4 0 
10. Czech Republic 52 12.5 3 2 
… Switzerland 7 (11.7 CHF) 9 2 0 
… South Africa > 7 (70 ZAR) 5 2 0 
… 
Norway 
(data 2000) > 0.6 (5 NOK) 10.5 2 0 
Sources:  Norwegian Church Aid 2005: 52, SECO 2001, South Africa 2003, Utenriksdepartementet 
2000, Small Arms Survey 2005: Tab. 4.3. 
 
However, in general, figures on 
the ratio of SALW production in com-
parison to the whole armament and 
military sector are difficult to obtain 
and different mechanisms of measur-
ing actual data of arms exports make 
efforts of comparison to a certain de-
gree unreliable (Bauer/Bromley 2004: 
11, 24-29). This is mainly due to statis-
tics that rely on figures collected ei-
ther exclusively by customs statistics 
or data provided by the industry itself 
and the preliminary export licences 
granted by the country in which the 
company is producing. Worse, the 
countries have very different ap-
proaches of issuing these export li-
cences which allow for loopholes in a 
number of cases (Weidacher 2005: 3-
4). 
Notwithstanding those figures, 
one should at least be able to take for 
granted that the HSN member coun-
tries are not interested in allowing the 
sale of these products to countries 
which have a high rate of human in-
security. In that respect, however, the 
picture is bleak. Companies in Austria 
and Switzerland have allowed pro-
duction of small arms under licence in 
other countries, thus circumventing 
all forms of domestic export controls 
(Control Arms 2003: 64). One of the 
top 4 SALW producers in Europe, the 
Austrian-based company Steyr-
Mannlicher, announced in 2004 that 
its complete production of military-
style firearms was to be moved to 
Malaysia (Weidacher 2005: 23). In 
2005 the company (as well as gov-
ernmental agencies) came under 
heavy criticism for exporting sniper 
rifles to Iran (ibid.: 78). 
Another example of loopholes 
and neglect of the issue is represented 
by a finding which followed the trac-
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ing back of confiscated weapons into 
the state of Rio in Brazil. Among oth-
ers, small arms from Austria and 
Switzerland were found, however, 
there was no official reaction by any 
government. “In July 2002, Brazil 
asked for international co-operation to 
trace the routes of the weapons in 
order to curb their flow into the noto-
riously crime-ridden state. So far 
there has been a deafening silence 
from all foreign countries involved, 
with the exceptions of Argentina and 
Germany” (Control Arms 2003: 65). 
As far as the four countries 
mentioned belonging to the HSN are 
concerned, their official call for a strict 
export control does not seem to match 
existent trade figures. The database of 
the Norwegian Initiative on Small 
Arms Transfers (NISAT) in the period 
from 1999-2003 (the period of efforts 
to curb SALW trade within the HSN 
framework) lists small arms exports 
from Austria to African countries 
such as the Congo, Egypt, Sudan, 
Zimbabwe and from Switzerland to 
Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Sudan 
(NISAT 2005). While Norway’s record 
with African countries besides exports 
to Egypt seems to be in line with the 
official rhetoric, exports to non-
democratic states such as Saudi Ara-
bia and El Salvador also reveal possi-
bilities of improvement (ibid.). Last 
but not least, figures for Canadian 
exports to Africa reveal shipments to 
Algeria, Egypt and Zimbabwe (ibid.). 
In addition, figures on trans-
parency in small arms trade reveal 
further scope for improvement, espe-
cially as far as the aforementioned 
regulations on production licences are 
concerned (Small Arms Survey 2004, 
ch. 4 plus Annex). Since most of the 
criticisms had been made public some 
years earlier, a real need to signifi-
cantly alter existing regulations does 
not seem to have been perceived in 
most national ministries responsible 
for the issue (Haug et al. 2002). Seen 
in this light, statements such as the 
one by the Austrian ambassador to 
the UN, Wernfried Köffler, that “more 
detailed information may be obtained 
from our national report” (Köffler 
2004), are somewhat hypocritical 
given the country’s 6.5 points out of a 
20 point transparency scheme and the 
fact that figures on the export of ar-
mament are still not available on a 
governmental website. In that respect 
Norway and Canada fare much better 
and receive 10.5 and 12 points respec-
tively (see Tab. 1). 
Besides trade in small arms, 
further inconsistencies in the arms 
trade can be named. Canada, for ex-
ample, has repeatedly sold armament 
or dual use equipment to the U.S., 
which is exempted from the country’s 
export regulations and controls. One 
of the most prominent cases was the 
sale of more than 20 helicopters to the 
U.S. which were “upgraded” and 
eventually delivered to Columbia to 
“dismantle the drugs trade”. Due to 
this loophole no export figures for 
exports to the U.S. are available, 
which may indirectly cause human 
insecurity (Control Arms 2005: 6ff.).7
Against the backdrop of in-
creasing controls of the shipment of 
SALW and other military equipment 
through multilateral efforts, it is fur-
thermore surprising that the HSN 
members “[…] further call on states to 
support the implementation of re-
gional initiatives and action plans” 
                                                 
7  Another issue which needs to be addressed 
in the future is how far companies which un-
dermine efforts to create human security can be 
held accountable by domestic and international 
legislation. Related to this is the aspect of 
whether such an undertaking is desired by the 
countries’ governments. 
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(HSN 2005a) and do not take part in 
some of these efforts themselves. 
Three noteworthy mechanisms 
have been established: the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement on export 
controls for conventional weapons 
and sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies in 1996 (Wassenaar Ar-
rangement 2005) and the UN Firearms 
Protocol which has entered into force 
recently (IANSA 2005). While the 
EU’s Code is primarily interested in 
harmonising the member states’ poli-
cies (Bauer/Bromley 2005), the Proto-
col’s purpose is “to promote, facilitate 
and strengthen cooperation among 
States Parties in order to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit manu-
facturing of and trafficking in fire-
arms, their parts and components and 
ammunition.” (UNGA 2001). The 
Wassenaar Agreement’s policy is 
intended to promote greater responsi-
bility in the arms trade but has more 
specific aspects as far as SALWs are 
concerned, since its objectives are to 
prevent the “destabilising accumula-
tion of such arms” and to “prevent 
the acquisition of conventional arms 
by terrorist groups and organisations, 
as well as by individual terrorists” 
(Wassenaar Arrangement 2002). 
Yet, while all four countries of 
the HSN that have been observed 
more closely are members of the Was- 
 
senaar Arrangement, the transpar-
ency of their export of SALWs remain 
way below the figures of other coun-
tries and large weapons exporters 
such as the U.S., the UK or Germany 
(Small Arms Survey 2005: 112). In-
comprehensibly, in addition, Switzer-
land as a HSN member does not form 
part of the UN Firearm Protocol to 
this day (UNSC 2005). What provides 
cause for optimism, though, is an 
increasing availability of statistics on 
ministries’ web sites, especially as far 
as the last two years in Canada and 
Norway are concerned. 
This short review is hoped to 
have shown that political leitmotifs, 
when applied to the whole set of for-
eign policies, allow for critical reflec-
tions on various elements of govern-
ment policy. When subscribing to a 
leitmotif the question arises how far 
relevant policies serve the self-
ascribed goals, and how far all gov-
ernment action is directed towards 
this proclaimed guiding vision. Poli-
cies which run counter to this priori-
tized leitmotif can be used to hold up 
a critical mirror to the government, to 
hold it accountable for its action (or 
neglect of action). After having looked 
at the SALW trade figures and prac-
tices one can conclude that further 
initiatives are needed to make gov-




5.  Conclusion 
In the cases of Austria, Switzer-
land, Norway, and Canada the “mir-
ror” on SALW trade reveals inconsis-
tencies and a gap between claims and 
substantiveness. Other countries of 
the HSN might also be included in 
this respect, most notably South Af-
rica, which is an observer of the HSN 
but is said to have the least strict laws 
on SALW trade. 
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Sometimes the image – as in the 
case of SALWs – is far more impress-
ing than the actual content. Despite 
the call for better controls of arms 
sales, dubious forms of export are 
practised by the countries making 
these calls, and, ironically, these 
might actually increase their market 
share, since the demand will be met 
less by Eastern European countries 
(e.g. Bulgaria), which have sold 
stockpiles to a significant extent. The 
exports of these latter SALWs have 
been increasingly controlled and pre-
vented. While there is an evident con-
tradiction in calling for an improve-
ment of human security and actually 
selling SALW in an ethically irrespon-
sible manner, progress also has to be 
taken into consideration 
(IANSA/Biting the Bullet 2005). Over 
the last decade governments have 
funded several local and regional 
initiatives on small arms surplus de-
struction and the like. 
On a theoretical level our find-
ings show that a closer look at and 
analysis of language is needed when 
it comes to evaluating foreign policy 
in today’s world. This is true for two 
reasons: firstly, because the language 
and meanings of words used in the 
foreign policy discourse undergo 
slight but often significant changes 
which are not analysed when the fo-
cus is exclusively on theoretical 
frameworks that do not take into ac-
count the performative character of 
language. Secondly, because foreign 
policy has undergone significant 
changes by sticking more closely to 
public opinion and becoming more 
based on ethics and values. This latter 
point has considerable consequences, 
as we have tried to show. An ethical, 
or more precisely, a human security 
policy is well suited to appealing to a 
country’s citizens, and it also allows 
for framing issues in terms of a value-
based context. Nevertheless, this also 
allows for a critical appraisal of such a 
policy – a factor that is often over-
looked. 
In general one can therefore say 
that political leitmotifs – and human 
security in particular – have the po-
tential advantage that they can be 
used as a “mirror” for critical observa-
tions with regard to whether govern-
ments live up to their promises and 
pretensions. When this is carried out, 
foreign policy might become more 
transparent while successfully incor-
porating ethical dimensions. Then the 
advantage of human security as a 
political leitmotif is that it does not 
refer to the state but rather focuses on 
individuals, thereby allowing a 
broader variety of actors to commit 
themselves to a specific policy goal. 
Moreover, because the leitmotif is so 
ambiguous (or, positively formulated, 
flexible and multi-faceted) it repre-
sents a window of opportunity for 
most countries and actors to work on 
at least certain issues of human secu-
rity by contributing resources and 
expertise in fields of paramount im-
portance to them. Therefore, overem-
phasizing the shortcomings of such 
leitmotifs as human security entails 
underestimating their potential, be-
cause it is these shortcomings which 
open up debate among societal 
groups on the legitimacy of certain 
decisions. Hence, it may well make 
the foreign policy process more de-
mocratic, because governments can be 
held accountable to match their rheto-
ric with action. 
This may add another crucial 
aspect to understanding the Human 
Security Agenda: namely, that there is 
a need for states to live up to their 
promises in order to make those “coa-
litions of the willing” (Axwor-
thy/Taylor 1998: 193) or concerted 
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policies of like-minded countries pos-
sible. Otherwise, successes like the 
Ottawa process, due to a “coalition of 
NGOs, humanitarian organizations, 
and medium and small powers” 
(ibid.: 192), will go down as a histori- 
 
cal coincidence. A transparent, com-
prehensive and broadly shared politi-
cal leitmotif might facilitate this kind 
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Defining and Implementing 




The end of the Cold War has 
made a serious impact on the nature 
of the international environment, on 
the way the foreign policy of states is 
to be conducted and on issues that are 
to be prioritised. While the deepening 
of globalisation has brought numer-
ous benefits to many countries, this 
process has widened the gap between 
rich and poor, both in a domestic and 
in an international context. Issues 
such as poverty, inequality, health 
and education have thus come to oc-
cupy states’ political agendas. Fur-
thermore, a number of countries have 
experienced political and economic 
instabilities since the end of the Cold 
War, which resulted in heavy casual-
ties, refugee and internally displaced 
person problems, landmines and 
small arms concerns. 
All these challenges and threats 
have triggered a debate on the under-
standing of security, shifting its focus 
from the traditional preoccupation 
with the state to the individual, i.e. 
the human being - its needs, concerns 
and development. Security thus be-
came a contested notion: state or hu-
man, military or non-military secu-
rity? Human security, which emerged 
as a concept out of this ‘post-Cold 
War search for a new security para-
digm’ (Acharya and Acharya 2000), 
has remained controversial as well. 
Are the basic human needs most cru-
cial? Should we rather focus on hu-
man development? Is not protecting  
people in conflict situations the core 
of this notion? Different approaches to 
the concept have resulted in a number 
of unclear definitions, making human 
security a point of discussion among 
scholars and analysts. Despite a lack 
of agreement as to what it precisely 
means, a number of governments, in 
first place Canada, Norway and Ja-
pan, have integrated the concept into 
their foreign policies and have under-
taken actions towards its implementa-
tion. 
This paper explores the concept 
of human security, by way of taking 
Japan as a case-study. It analyses Ja-
pan’s path to human security, the in-
troduction and definition of the con-
cept in the Japanese context, and Ja-
pan’s concrete initiatives for its im-
plementation. The paper demon-
strates that both the conceptualisation 
and practical implementation of this 
notion by Japan reflects the Japanese 
historical and normative background, 
and the country’s particular prefer-
ence for non-military and human-
centred foreign policy. In so doing, 
this paper argues that instead of try-
ing to make human security a coher-
ent concept, scholars should accept its 
multifaceted nature and hence ana-
lyse it from the perspective of differ-
ent actors, whose approaches to the 
concept may be an expression of ac-






1. Human Security within the Broader Debate 
on Security 
The debate in security studies 
since the end of the Cold War has 
shifted the traditional, or old, focus of 
security from the state to a new refer-
ent object, i.e. the individual, and has 
expanded the portrayal of threats 
solely in military terms to encompass 
non-traditional, or non-military, types 
of threats. The changing nature of se-
curity from the beginning of the 1990s 
has become the ground on which the 
concept of human security was devel-
oped. In this sense, human security, 
with its primary focus on humans and 
non-military threats, has come to re-
flect the contested notion of security. 
Human security has emerged 
largely as a response to ethnic con-
flicts and civil wars, the deepening of 
globalisation, the widening gap be-
tween rich and poor and the spread-
ing of human rights after the end of 
the Cold War. As a new and non-
traditional view of security, human 
security was first mentioned in the 
1994 United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) annual publication 
called Human Development Report (see 
UNDP 1994: 22). Following the report, 
the concept gained quickly popularity 
within international society, which 
can be attributed to its emphasising 
the human being, in contrast to the 
traditional state-centric view of secu-
rity. In terms of conceptualisation, 
however, human security has re-
mained a contested notion, as its 
strongest proponents have produced 
a number of broad and inconsistent 
definitions, and have not reached an 
agreement as to what it precisely 
means. As a result, human security 
has been criticised for being a ‘mean-
ingless’ notion, failing to provide ei-
ther policy-makers with practical 
tools for devising particular policies 
or scholars with analytical tools for 
scholarly research (Newman 2001; 
Paris 2001). Despite such criticisms, 
human security became so popular 
throughout the 1990s that it led to the 
establishment by Canada and Nor-
way of a ‘human security network’1, 
consisting of states and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
engaged in the promotion of this 
‘new’ security concept. The most ac-
tive advocates of human security have 
become the governments of Canada, 
Norway and Japan, with Japan and 
Canada however promoting different 
approaches to the concept. 
At the same time, instead of 
trying to make human security a co-
herent concept, using it as Roland 
Paris (2001) suggests, as ‘a descriptive 
label for a class of research’ may 
eliminate the problem of finding a 
universal definition. Thus, human 
security may be regarded as a broad 
category of research in the field of 
security studies that mainly explores 
non-military threats to individuals, 
groups and societies (ibid.). In this 
way, it could accommodate the works 
of those scholars that look beyond the 
traditional, i.e. state-centric and mili-
tary, interpretation of security. Fur-
thermore, such an approach would 
permit for an explanation of human 
security from the perspective of vari-
ous actors, whose ways of dealing 
with human security issues may re-
                                                 
1  For information on the network, see its 
official website: <http://www.humansecurity 
network.org/menu-e.php>. 
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flect specific historical backgrounds 
and social norms, and represent dif-
ferences in strategic thinking and pol-
icy choices (see also Newman 2001).  
Against this background, the 
following sections of the paper will 
discuss why and how Japan has be-
come one of the world’s leading states 
in the promotion of human security, 
and will illustrate that the country’s 
approach to the concept is linked to 
Japan’s non-military foreign policy 
identity, based on its historical back-
ground and adherence to anti-
militarist norms and pacifism. In this 
way, the case of Japan will serve to 
confirm the proposition that ap-
proaches to human security may re-
flect actors’ particular backgrounds 
and foreign policy preferences, which 
could explain the concept’s multifac-
eted nature. Accordingly, human se-
curity may be regarded as a category 
of research and used, therefore, as a 
basis for addressing specific questions 
or issues, and for developing viable 
policy recommendations.  
 
2.  Japan’s Path to Human Security 
2.1 Historical and Normative 
Context of Japan’s Foreign 
and Security Policy after 
1945 
The ending of World War II left 
Japan completely devastated, facing 
an urgent need for economic and so-
cietal rehabilitation. In order to 
achieve this, Japan had no other 
choice but to align itself with the 
West, which was established with the 
simultaneous signature in 1951 of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 
US-Japan Security Treaty. Despite 
Japan’s military alliance with the US, 
however, the devastating experience 
of defeat and the fears of a militarist 
revival led Tokyo policy-makers to 
pursue a ‘peaceful’ foreign and secu-
rity policy, which reflected Japan’s 
post-war ‘culture of anti-militarism’ 
(Berger 1993, 1996). 
The policy of being a member 
of the Western camp brought numer-
ous advantages for Japan. It helped 
the country, first, maintain peace and 
democracy, and, second, achieve eco-
nomic growth and prosperity under 
the security umbrella of the US. By 
way of prioritising its military alliance 
with Washington Tokyo ensured the 
guaranteeing of Japan’s national secu-
rity. Through the pursuit of economic 
security, on the other hand, Japanese 
policy-makers sought to avoid engag-
ing the country in the military dimen-
sion of security, which remained 
highly contested due to the legacy of 
Japan’s militarist past. The focus on 
economic growth, furthermore, re-
flected what from the 1980s became 
known in Japan as the concept of  
‘comprehensive security’. It was an 
interpretation of Japanese security 
from a broader perspective than the 
traditional military dimension, and 
included social, economic and politi-
cal aspects for achieving national se-
curity objectives (Katzenstein and 
Okawara 1993: 105-8; Katzenstein 
1996: 3). 
The priority given to economic 
expansion was strengthened by the 
non-acceptance of the use of military 
force as a legitimate instrument of 




the post-war ‘pacifist’ Constitution of 
1947 through Article 9, which re-
stricted Japanese military activities to 
self-defence only.2 Related to this, at 
the end of the 1960s, Japan embraced 
the three non-nuclear principles - not 
to produce, possess or bring into Ja-
pan nuclear weapons. These anti-
militarist norms have become the 
strongest characteristics of the Japa-
nese state ever since 1945, having 
their roots in collective memories of 
the militarist expansion and the fol-
lowing war with America (Berger 
1993). They have further come to de-
fine Japan’s priority in terms of purs-
ing peaceful means of foreign policy 
(e.g., foreign aid and investment; co-
operation in the civilian and non-
military sphere of action), which be-
came ‘the most important hallmark of 
Japan’s security policy’ (Katzenstein 
1996: 10). 
Tokyo’s close ties with, and de-
pendence on, Washington in the secu-
rity area prevented Japan from having 
an active foreign policy and hindered 
its ability to shape international 
events independently. This is the rea-
son why Japan has long been de-
scribed as a ‘reactive’ state, i.e. a state 
that reacted to international situations 
and demands of other countries, 
mainly the US. The reactive approach 
during the Cold War, applied to Ja-
pan’s international political role, 
sharply contrasted with the country’s 
fast economic expansion throughout 
the 1970s and the 1980s. However, a 
need for Japan to commit to active 
international behaviour arose sharply 
following the Persian Gulf Crisis of 
1990, to which Japan responded with 
a US$ 13 billion financial contribution, 
yet failed to contribute to multina-
                                                 
2  See The Constitution of Japan, Article 9. 
<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/En
glish/english-Constitution.html> (27.06.2005). 
tional forces, i.e. to dispatch its Self-
Defence Forces (SDF) to the Gulf. To-
kyo’s reliance on its ‘chequebook di-
plomacy’, i.e. on financial contribu-
tions only, and the inability of Japa-
nese policy-makers to deal with such 
an international crisis resulted in se-
vere international humiliation and 
criticism, which acted as a push for a 
serious redefinition of Japan’s post-
1989 foreign policy behaviour. As Ja-
pan had risen to the level of a state 
being able to exert political influence 
on its international environment, its 
foreign policy had to be adapted so as 
to reflect the country’s economic ca-
pabilities. 
2.2 Pursuing a Proactive 
International Role from the 
1990s 
Following the Gulf War criti-
cism and responding to the need for 
greater engagement in the area of in-
ternational security, in the course of 
the 1990s Japan significantly increased 
its multilateral personnel involvement 
for the maintenance of international 
peace and stability. In June 1992 the 
country enacted the International 
Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL), which 
enabled participation of its personnel 
in international humanitarian relief 
operations and contribution to the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions (UNPKO) on a fully-fledged 
scale. Since the enactment of the IPCL 
Japan has dispatched its SDF to par-
ticipate in both UNPKO and non-
combat humanitarian relief missions, 
and has sent electoral observers to 
elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. The IPCL was amended in 
December 2001 to enable Japan’s full-
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scale participation in the primary du-
ties of Peacekeeping Forces (PKF).3  
Furthermore, throughout the 
first post-Cold War decade Japan ex-
panded its development and humani-
tarian aid programs, and became ac-
tively involved in global crisis man-
agement, comprehensive conflict pre-
vention and environmental protec-
tion. In addition, the 1990s saw a 
deepening of Japan’s relationship 
with the EC/EU4, which came to en-
compass strictly humanitarian and 
civil agendas. The partnership be-
tween the two was further strength-
ened by the adoption of the Joint Ja-
pan-EU Action Plan in 2001, which 
has been followed by a process of im-
plementation by both sides.  
The altered international envi-
ronment after the end of the Cold War 
also caused a change in the US-Japan 
alliance, which was reassessed and 
strengthened throughout the 1990s in 
order to adequately respond to the 
new political agenda and security 
challenges of the post-Cold War era.5 
In the aftermath of the 11 September 
terrorist attacks on the US, Japan en-
acted the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law, which permitted the 
dispatch of its SDF to the Indian 
Ocean to provide rear-area logistical 
support for the US and coalition naval 
ships fighting in Afghanistan. Fur-
thermore, as Japan became one of the 
                                                 
3  PKF's primary duties refer to such activities 
as monitoring of disarmament of armed forces; 
stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; traffic 
check or disposal of abandoned weapons 
among the international peace cooperation 
works. 
4  For a brilliant analysis of Japan-EC/EU 
relations, see Gilson (2000). 
5  This was done through the signing of the 
1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alli-
ance for the 21st century and the revision of the 
original 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation in 1997. 
first supporters of the US policy to-
wards Iraq in 2003, the Koizumi gov-
ernment introduced a law for the re-
construction of Iraq in July 2003, 
which permitted Japan to engage pro-
actively in the rebuilding of Iraq, in 
the form of both financial and human 
contribution. The latter was achieved 
with the dispatch at the beginning of 
2004 of Japan’s SDF on a humanitar-
ian mission to the southern part of 
Iraq, which was extended for one 
more year in December 2004. While 
the dispatch was done without the 
sanction of the international commu-
nity and therefore caused a lot of con-
troversies both inside and outside 
Japan, it was clearly for non-combat 
purposes. 
As has been illustrated with the 
above analysis, Japan’s post-war paci-
fism and adherence to anti-militarist 
norms have continued to define Japa-
nese foreign and security policy after 
the end of the Cold War. Different 
avenues, which Japan has used for 
exercising an active international role, 
have aided the country to promote 
non-military security cooperation and 
respond to non-traditional security 
challenges. They have reflected Ja-
pan’s non-military stance on security 
diplomacy, thereby directing the path 
of its international behaviour.  In this 
context, the rise of human security in 
Japan’s foreign policy at the end of 
the 1990s can be regarded as having 
emerged naturally from the country’s 







3. Introducing Human Security 
3.1 The Role of Prime Minister 
Obuchi 
The recognition of the human 
security concept in Japan was directly 
related to the Asian currency and fi-
nancial crises that hit East and South-
East Asia in July 1997. While having a 
devastating impact on the economies 
of the Asian countries, increasing 
poverty and spreading political insta-
bility, the crises gave rise to a new 
understanding of security, focusing 
the attention of the Asian people on 
humans and not on states (Acharya 
and Acharya 2000). In the context of 
the Asian crises, Prime Minister Obu-
chi Keizō6 (1998-2000) delivered two 
speeches at the end of 1998 with 
which he introduced the concept of 
human security. While the concept 
served as a means to emphasise Ja-
pan’s efforts in response to the crises 
(Fukushima 2004: 13), these speeches 
became the basis for the subsequent 
integration of human security into 
Japanese diplomacy and, moreover, 
for making it, as described in the 2000 
Diplomatic Bluebook, ‘a key perspective 
in developing Japan’s foreign policy’.7
On 2 December 1998 in Tokyo, 
Obuchi defined the concept as ‘the 
key, which comprehensively covers 
all the menaces that threaten the sur-
vival, daily life, and dignity of human 
beings and strengthens the efforts to 
                                                 
6  The Japanese personal names are given 
according to Japanese convention, with the 
surname first, followed by the given name. 
7  See the official website of the Japanese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs for various issues of the 
Diplomatic Bluebook:  <http://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
policy/other/bluebook>. 
 
confront those threats’ (Obuchi 
1998a). He further stressed that Japan 
had contributed to Asian countries to 
help them dealing with the crises, and 
had assisted, in the first place, the ‘so-
cially vulnerable segments of popula-
tion on whom economic difficulties 
have the heaviest impacts’. Finally, 
Obuchi proposed making ‘the 21st 
century a human-centred century’, by 
which he clearly emphasised his per-
ception of security in terms of people, 
in contrast to the traditional, state-
centric approach. Later the same 
month, in his speech at the ASEAN+3 
Summit in Hanoi on December 16, 
Obuchi declared that the 21st century 
for Asia should be ‘a century of peace 
and prosperity built on human dig-
nity’ (Obuchi 1998b). Furthermore, as 
an expression of Japan’s commitment 
to the promotion of human security, 
Obuchi announced that Japan had 
decided to make a financial contribu-
tion for the establishment of a Human 
Security Fund under the United Na-
tions. The fund was established only 
three months after Obuchi’s Hanoi 
speech, in March 1999, on the basis of 
Japan’s financial contribution. 
The two speeches by Obuchi 
Keizō in 1998 can be considered as the 
foundation on which Japan’s ap-
proach to human security was later 
developed and its policy agenda de-
vised (Fukushima 2004: 16). He 
clearly used the concept of human 
security for referring to developmen-
tal policies from a human-centred 
perspective rather than to traditional 
security policy with military emphasis 
(Edström 2003: 214). Human security, 
therefore, was a rather natural exten-
sion of Japan’s non-military and hu-
man-oriented international behaviour 
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throughout the 1990s, which explains 
why it was easily integrated into 
Japanese foreign policy after Obuchi’s 
speeches. The 2000 Diplomatic Bluebook 
states that: ‘Prime Minister Obuchi 
clearly located “human security” in 
Japan’s foreign policy’, while the 2001 
Diplomatic Bluebook refers to human 
security as ‘the cornerstone of interna-
tional cooperation in the 21st century’ 
with Japan ‘working to make the new 
century a human-centred century’. 
Furthermore, starting with the 2000 
Diplomatic Bluebook, human security is 
described in subsequent issues (2001, 
2002, 2003) as being ‘a key perspec-
tive’ of Japanese foreign policy. 
Against this background, as has been 
argued by Werthes/Bosold (in this 
Report), one could say that this new 
security concept has become a ‘politi-
cal leitmotif’ of Japan’s foreign policy. 
3.2 Further Initiatives 
Following Obuchi’s sudden 
death in May 2000 human security 
has remained an important pillar in 
the policies of successive Japanese 
administrations. Prime Minister Mori 
Yoshirō (2000-2001), the immediate 
successor of Obuchi, maintained a 
strong support for human security. In 
his speech at the Millennium Summit 
of the UN in September 2000, Mori 
emphasised that human security has 
become ‘one of the pillars of its [Japa-
nese] diplomacy’ and Japan, there-
fore, ‘will spare no effort to make the 
21st century a human-centred cen-
tury’, while being committed to fur-
ther develop ‘the concept of this hu-
man-centred approach’ (Mori 2000). 
In this context, Mori announced the 
Japanese government's plan to make 
an additional substantial contribution 
to the Trust Fund for Human Security 
(initially called the Human Security 
Fund), and Japan’s intention to create  
‘an international committee on human 
security’. Following Mori’s an-
nouncement, the inauguration of the 
Commission on Human Security was 
formally declared in January 2001. 
The successor of Mori in April 
2001, Koizumi Junichirō (2001-
present), referred to human security 
when he addressed the International 
Symposium on Human Security in 
December 2001. Although he focused 
primarily on Japan’s response to the 
11 September terrorist attacks on the 
US and Japan’s role in the reconstruc-
tion of Afghanistan, Koizumi linked 
the eradication of terrorism with the 
necessity to deal with ‘other diverse 
threats to individuals’ because ‘armed 
conflicts, poverty and other socio-
economic factors create "hotbeds" for 
terrorism’ (Koizumi 2001). He under-
lined that human security was impor-
tant, for it served ‘to protect survival, 
livelihood and dignity of individual 
human beings from diverse threats 
…so as to realize the full potential of 
each person’. In his speech to the Diet 
in January 2003, Koizumi said that 
human security should be a priority 
focus of Japanese Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) (cited in Fu-
kushima 2004: 16). 
Since its introduction by Obu-
chi in 1998, human security has been 
actively promoted by Japanese deci-
sion-makers. While Koizumi has ar-
ticulated human security less explic-
itly in his speeches in comparison to 
his predecessors, the concept has con-
tinued to be seen as an operational 
tool for achieving practical goals in 
accordance with Japan’s human-
centred diplomacy. Furthermore, as 
will be discussed below, under Koi-
zumi the concept has come to occupy 





3.3 Concretizing Human 
Security 
Japan has advocated an ap-
proach to human security closely re-
lated to the 1994 formulation of the 
UNDP, thereby embracing a broad 
definition of both freedom from want 
and from fear. In line with Obuchi’s 
Tokyo speech of 1998, human security 
was described in the 1999 Diplomatic 
Bluebook as a notion that ‘comprehen-
sively covers all the menaces that 
threaten human survival, daily life 
and dignity […] and strengthens ef-
forts to confront these threats’. Possi-
ble security threats included issues as 
various as environmental degrada-
tion, violations of human rights, 
transnational organised crime, refu-
gees, poverty and infectious diseases 
such as AIDS. This official Japanese 
interpretation of human security was 
somewhat changed in the 2002 Diplo-
matic Bluebook. While emphasising the 
need for protection of ‘the lives, liveli-
hoods, and dignity of individual hu-
man beings’, the document also 
stressed the realisation of ‘the abun-
dant potential inherent in each indi-
vidual’. The formulation thus focused 
not only on the protection of the indi-
vidual from threats, but also on its 
broad development as a human being. 
The general emphasis, however, was 
rather placed on the freedom from 
want aspect of human security. 
The freedom from fear interpre-
tation is also present in the Japanese 
definition, although the human costs 
of violent conflicts do not represent 
the main focus for Japan as they do, 
for example, for Canada. The Japa-
nese government has clearly stated 
that, for Japan, human security was a 
broader concept, with freedom from 
want being ‘no less critical’ than free-
dom from fear, and, therefore, it was 
‘necessary to go beyond thinking of 
human security solely in terms of pro-
tecting human life in conflict situa-
tions’ (Takasu 2000a). In this regard, 
Japan has distanced itself from the 
Canadian approach to human security 
in terms of humanitarian interven-
tion.8 The Japanese government has 
argued that such an interpretation has 
been used as justification for the use 
of force in situations with massive 
human rights violations, which, in 
Japanese view, was an extremely ‘con-
troversial issue’ that required careful 
examination ‘not only on moral and 
political but also on legal grounds’ 
(Takasu 2000b). Indeed, for Japan the 
use of force cannot be a means for 
ensuring human security. The legal 
constraints based on Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution prohibit the 
country from intervening militarily in 
armed conflicts. Most importantly, 
however, the strong anti-militarism 
that permeates Japanese society and is 
reflected in the country’s pursuit of a 
non-military foreign policy behaviour 
makes humanitarian intervention a 
very undesirable option for Japan. 
The Japanese interpretation of 
human security has remained to a 
great extent unchanged since the in-
troduction of the concept in 1998, al-
though it has been slightly revised. 
The emphasis has continued to be 
placed on human needs rather than 
on protection of people from violent 
conflicts. At the same time, a stress on 
human fulfilment and development 
was added, which was further ex-
panded in the 2003 final report of the 
Commission on Human Security (to 
be discussed in the following section). 
In particular, the focus on the ‘devel-
opment’ aspect of human security has 
been reflected in, and implemented 
through, Japanese ODA policy. 
                                                 
8  See Fukushima (2004) for a detailed analy-
sis of the Canadian definition. 
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4. Substantiating and Implementing Human 
security 
Japan has been implementing 
human security through, on the one 
hand, the Trust Fund For Human Se-
curity (hereafter the Trust Fund) and 
ODA, and on the other, the Commis-
sion on Human Security (CHS) (Fu-
kushima 2004: 22). While the Trust 
Fund and ODA have been used to put 
the concept into practice, the task of 
the CHS was to formulate a definition 
of human security and make recom-
mendations to the international soci-
ety that would serve as guidelines for 
future policies and actions. 
4.1 The Trust Fund for Human 
Security 
Initially called the Human Se-
curity Fund, the Trust Fund was es-
tablished in March 1999 in the UN 
with an initial contribution from the 
Japanese government of approxi-
mately US$ 4.63 million (¥500 mil-
lion). Since then, the fund has re-
ceived additional financial assistance 
from Japan which by the end of the 
fiscal year 2004 (March 2005) had 
amounted to approximately US$ 256 
million (¥29 billion), making the Trust 
Fund one of the largest of its kind es-
tablished in the UN (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Japan 2005: 9). The Trust 
Fund donations have been used to 
support projects implemented by UN-
related organisations, which address 
from the perspective of human secu-
rity threats such as poverty, environ-
mental degradation, conflicts, land-
mines and infectious diseases. The 
main focus of the projects has been in 
the area of community development 
and post-conflict peace-building (Fu-
kushima 2004: 22), which reflects the 
priority that the Trust Fund gives to 
the least developed countries and 
those affected by conflicts.9
4.2 The Official Development 
Assistance Program 
The introduction of human se-
curity into ODA followed Obuchi’s 
speeches at the end of 1998.10 In the 
1999 annual Japanese ODA report 
(which in 2001 was renamed as White 
Paper on ODA renamed from the 
2001 White Paper on ODA) a section 
on ‘Human security and ODA’ was 
included, which quoted Obuchi’s 
promotion of the concept and referred 
to ODA projects aimed at realising 
human security in practice, such as 
Japan’s assistance to Kosovo and pro-
grams for the removal of anti-
personnel landmines (Fukushima 
2004: 23). Although human security 
was mentioned in the subsequent 
White Papers, it was only from 2003 
onwards that it came to occupy a sub-
stantial place in Japan’s ODA pro-
gram. This was a result of the revision 
                                                 
9  The 2005 Trust Fund pamphlet (March 
2005) gives the following statistics: the largest 
number of projects, out of total 118 approved 
by the fund, are in the area of health and medi-
cal care (30%) and poverty (27%), followed by 
refugee problems (12%) and conflict (11%). The 
budget allocated to the projects (out of total 
appr. US$ 149 million) shows that those related 
to conflict situations occupy the first place 
(appr. US$ 55 million, or 37%), followed by 
poverty (appr. US$ 32 million, or 21% ) and 
health (appr. US$ 28 million, or 18%).  
10  For details about Japan’s ODA, see the 





of the ODA charter, the basic docu-
ment of Japan’s ODA policy.  
The revised ODA charter iden-
tified human security as one of the 
‘basic policies’ of ODA, describing it 
as an important perspective through 
which ‘direct threats to individuals 
such as conflicts, disasters, infectious 
diseases’ could be addressed (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2003). 
The text stated that Japan would im-
plement ODA ‘to strengthen the ca-
pacity of local communities through 
human resource development’ and 
would ‘extend assistance for the pro-
tection and empowerment of indi-
viduals’ with a view of ensuring that 
human dignity would be maintained 
‘from the conflict stage to the recon-
struction and development stages’. 
The stress on both protection from 
threats and empowerment of indi-
viduals was thus in line with the 
Japanese interpretation of human se-
curity. In order to materialise the con-
cept in reality, Japan has used the 
Trust Fund as a main vehicle for the 
realisation of human security objec-
tives, and has additionally utilised the 
Grant Assistance for Grassroots Hu-
man Security Projects.  
Asia has remained a priority 
region in the new ODA charter, as 
was the case under the former charter. 
In this framework, Japan has ex-
tended ODA, particularly to South-
East Asian countries, to support their 
economic and social development, 
and with a view to alleviating re-
gional disparities. Africa has also con-
tinued to be an important addressee 
of Japan’s ODA, with Japan providing 
aid through the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development 
(TICAD) process, and by way of ex-
tending grant aid in the areas of 
health and medical care, education, 
water and food. Other initiatives in-
clude Japan’s participation for peace 
consolidation in, and reconstruction 
of, Sri Lanka, and assistance provided 
for political, economic and social insti-
tution building in Cambodia, Kosovo, 
East Timor and Afghanistan. 
4.3 The Commission on 
Human Security (CHS) 
The CHS was established in 
January 2001 on the initiative of the 
Japanese government and in response 
to the UN Secretary-General’s call at 
the 2000 Millennium Summit of the 
United Nations for a world ‘free of 
want’ and ‘free of fear’. The commis-
sion was mandated to develop the 
concept of human security as an op-
erational tool for policy formulation 
and implementation, and to propose 
concrete initiatives for dealing with 
human security issues. As such, the 
CHS was supposed to promote the 
understanding of the concept and en-
courage greater engagement on the 
part of international society for its 
practical realisation. In 2003, the CHS 
compiled a final report titled ‘Human 
security now’, which was submitted 
to both the Prime Minister Koizumi 
and the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, and published in May 2003.  
According to the CHS report, 
human security seeks ‘to protect the 
vital core of all human lives in ways 
that enhance human freedoms and hu-
man fulfilment’ (CHS 2003: 4, emphasis 
added).  ‘Fundamental freedoms’, it 
was said in the report, are those that 
‘are the essence of life’ and human 
security, therefore, meant protecting 
those freedoms from ‘critical (severe) 
and pervasive (widespread) threats 
and situations’ (ibid. 4). The report 
further emphasised that human secu-
rity reinforced human dignity and 
also aimed ‘at developing the capa-
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bilities of individuals and communi-
ties’ to act on their own behalf (ibid.). 
In this way, the CHS report added to 
the ‘protection’ aspect of human secu-
rity an ‘empowerment’ interpretation, 
which stressed the abilities of indi-
viduals to protect themselves from 
threats and conflicts, and to respond 
to problems. Human security was, 
therefore, described in the report as 
encompassing several kinds of free-
dom – ‘freedom from want and free-
dom from fear, as well as freedom to 
take action on one’s own behalf’ (ibid. 
10). The CHS report further explored 
two particular aspects of human secu-
rity – first, conflict-related concerns 
and second, development-related is-
sues. The report underlined that the 
topics selected were ‘suggestive 
rather than exhaustive’, which was 
hoped to encourage further explora-
tion of human security issues by the 
international community (ibid. 12). 
The CHS report has been criti-
cised for not being able to propose a 
clear definition of the concept of hu- 
 
man security in terms of its being 
freedom from fear or freedom from 
want (Fukushima 2004: 28). As is em-
phasised at the beginning of the CHS 
report, however, ‘any concept of hu-
man security must be dynamic’, be-
cause ‘what people consider to be ‘vi-
tal’ – what they consider to be ‘of the 
essence of life’ and ‘crucially impor-
tant’ – varies across individuals and 
societies’ (CHS 2003: 4). Thus, the re-
port’s main contribution should be 
seen from the perspective of its explic-
itly addressing the topic and suggest-
ing concrete actions, thereby clearly 
locating the security of people within 
current discussions on security. The 
report has, furthermore, set the scene 
for a continuation of the debate on 
human security both inside and out-
side of Japan, encouraging further 
action with its recommendations 
rather than serving as a defining tool. 
This is the reason why it was clearly 
stated in the CHS report that it re-
frained from ‘proposing an itemised 
list of what makes up human security’ 
(ibid.). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The Japanese approach to hu-
man security has been more as a pol-
icy tool for activities in the area of 
non-traditional security, than as a par-
ticular conceptualisation that needs 
precise definition in order to be put 
into practice. Not only has human 
security become ‘one of the key per-
spectives’ of the country’s foreign pol-
icy – that is, serving as a political 
leitmotif – but it also quite quickly 
found its way into being implemented 
in practice through Japan’s develop-
ment policies and activities in the area 
of post-conflict peace-building and, 
recently, efforts in peace consolida-
tion. 
Human security, with its focus 
on threats other than the traditional 
military ones, reflects the Japanese 
‘comprehensive’ view of security, ad-
vocated vis-à-vis its own national se-
curity as early as from the 1980s and 
applied to the international context 
after the end of the Cold War. As an 
expression of the changing nature of 
security with the individual as a ref-
erent object, the Japanese approach 




man needs and human development, 
which is materialised in practice 
through its ODA policy. Human secu-
rity, furthermore, expresses the values 
of a society dedicated to peace and 
permeated by anti-militarism, and 
strongly opposed to coercive means, 
such as the use of force. Yet, the Japa-
nese approach also stresses the need 
to prevent conflicts and to deal with 
their consequences for humans. 
Against this background, human se-
curity is a rather natural extension of 
Japan’s non-military security agenda, 
as well as a possibility for Japanese 
policy-makers to increase the coun-
try’s role in international peace and 
security. Human security thus reflects 
Japan’s historical background and 
norms, its evolution from a reactive to 
a proactive state and its particular 
preferences for peaceful means both 
for solutions of conflicts and interna-
tional cooperation. 
This paper has illustrated that, 
despite being described by a number 
of scholars as a ‘meaningless’ notion, 
for Japan human security has become 
an instrument for foreign policy ac-
tions in line with the country’s inter-
national behaviour. While as a con-
cept of security it may be too broad to 
be defined in a coherent way, human 
security may be regarded as a class of 
research in the field of security stud-
ies mainly concerned with non-
military threats to actors other than 
states. Such a field may then accom-
modate different conceptualisations 
and approaches that could reflect ac-
tor’s specific backgrounds and policy 
preferences. While formulations may 
vary, they could be used, as has been 
demonstrated by Japan, as recom-
mendations and policy tools for the 
practical realisation of the security of 
the individual, which, first and fore-
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Promoting respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms 
through foreign policy-making is 
more than just an end in itself. 
Viewed from a liberal-democratic 
perception of foreign policy, it is the 
means through which to achieve a 
democratic peace and thereby pro-
mote security.1 This premise is based 
on the assumption that nations re-
specting the rights and freedoms of 
their citizens are less prone to internal 
upheaval and more prone to the 
maintenance of friendly inter-state 
relations (Donnelly 1998, Risse-Kapen 
1995, Russett 1998). The concept of 
‘democratic peace’ is therefore closely 
interlinked with the inclusion of hu-
man rights in policy-making. The de-
velopments in international law and 
the changing norms and standards 
within the international community 
which occurred in the second half of 
the twentieth century have redefined 
the concept of sovereignty and what 
is considered a legitimate foreign pol-
icy objective. The consequences of the 
two World Wars, the creation of the 
UN framework, and the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, along 
with the codification and institution-
alisation of individual and minority 
rights within international and re-
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this paper was pre-
sented at the Third ECPR Conference, which 
was held in Budapest, 8-10 September 2005 as 
part of the panel on Human Security and on 
Foreign Policy Agendas – Theoretical and Prac-
tical Implications. The author is grateful to the 
valuable comments and feedback of the panel 
convener Tobias Debiel and to Taylor Owen. 
gional institutions, have redefined the 
position of individuals in interna-
tional relations and the terms of their 
relationship with their Nation-States. 
This took place against the backdrop 
of bipolar competition between ideo-
logical systems and often conflicting 
perceptions of democracy and human 
rights (i.e. individual v. community 
rights/ first v. second generation 
rights, etc.) 
In the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, it became part of the ‘mo-
rality of states’ to acknowledge rights 
and obligations to entities which are 
not states, such as individuals, ethnic 
groups, interest groups, non-
governmental organisations, etc (Hill 
1989). Such entities emerged as actors 
increasingly able to influence the poli-
cies, the objectives, the choice of 
means and instruments, and the pub-
lic debate of the traditionally ‘su-
preme’ actors of international rela-
tions. NGOs and (intergovernmental 
and supranational) institutions played 
a fundamental role in advancing the 
idea of international and regional le-
gal protection of human rights and in 
pushing human rights concerns onto 
diplomatic agendas. Moreover, the 
globalisation process and interna-
tional telecommunication and media 
networks accelerated the dissemina-
tion of human rights idea(l)s and 
world-wide public awareness of hu-






1. Setting the Background to Human Rights, 
Foreign Policy and Security 
As described above changing 
international norms were given an 
added impetus with the end of the 
Cold War. The apparent success of the 
liberal democratic model based on the 
respect and protection of human 
rights made the promotion of these 
rights and freedoms into necessary 
elements for the achievement of 
peace, stability and co-operation. 
They have thus come to occupy a cen-
tral position in contemporary interna-
tional relations and in foreign policy-
making. 
Although the fall of the Iron 
Curtain freed international relations 
from bipolar power politics, a new 
phase of instability was triggered 
with the disintegration of the Soviet 
structures, the effects of new states 
being created across Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, and with the multiplication 
of ethnic wars and regional conflicts 
across the world. The concept of secu-
rity was expanded in its scope and 
nature to include human security, and 
without a competing ideology, de-
mocracy, human rights and the rule of 
law became identified as the corner-
stones of international peace and re-
gional security. The discourse on in-
dividual and minority rights led to 
the legitimisation of humanitarian 
intervention, even through military 
means, thereby deeply affecting the 
nature of state sovereignty. Hence, in 
spite of persisting human rights 
abuses and a degree of rhetoric hy-
pocrisy and selective application that 
continued to surround human rights 
issues in world politics, individual 
and minority rights became interna-
tional standards of respect and legiti-
macy. Even cases where governments 
merely paid lip-service to human 
rights or used human rights issues in 
their relations with third states in a 
purely instrumental manner (i.e. to 
deny the granting of, or to acquire 
development assistance) may have 
paradoxically contributed to the 
emergence of norms, standards, prac-
tices, and general expectations within 
domestic and international public 
opinion, and within international or-
ganisations. These in turn further af-
fected government policies. This spi-
ralling effect led many states to de-
clare ‘ethical’ foreign policies2 and 
from the receiving end, many other 
states (particularly from Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the 
Third World) to increasingly accept 
conditionality as the rule of the game. 
In effect, trade, co-operation and as-
sistance agreements, and membership 
in regional, international or suprana-
tional organisations have become 
conditional upon democratisation 
criteria and the respect of their citi-
zens’ fundamental rights and free-
doms. It appears that at the end of the 
20th century, despite the existence of 
cultural relativist objections and the 
persistence of inconsistencies in the 
application of human rights policies, 
the traditional theoretical tensions 
reproaching the inclusion of ethical 
considerations in inter-state relations 
had been largely overcome.  
In more recent years, however, 
the role of human rights in foreign 
policy and in international relations 
                                                 
2  For example, New Labour declared the 
launch of an ethical foreign policy in 1997. 
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has been characterised by conflicting 
and often contradictory approaches 
and practices. On the one hand, re-
spect for human rights is entrenched 
as a fundamental cornerstone for sta-
bility, security, democracy, good 
neighbourly relations, and develop-
ment. On the other hand, security pri-
orities seem to take precedence over 
upholding certain rights that have 
been long identified as belonging to a 
core of human rights, and at times 
even to be furthered to the detriment 
of civil rights and liberties. In the post 
9/11 world, human rights are just as 
relevant – if not more, though the de-
bate has increasingly shifted to main-
taining the balance between security 
and respect for civil liberties in the 
fight against terrorism. 
In effect, it has become com-
monplace to argue that since the 
events of 9/11, the tensions between 
human rights and security have been 
reintroduced. NGOs active in the field 
of human rights and protection of 
civil liberties3, have been particularly 
concerned that the universality of 
human rights is being challenged. 
Double standards and selectivity are 
becoming the norm through the anti-
terrorism legislation that has been 
adopted and through increasingly 
common practices of indefinite deten-
tions without trial, special courts 
based on secret evidence, the absence 
of sufficient judicial oversight, inhu-
man treatment of detainees, asylum 
application handling, etc. This is all 
the more disconcerting given that 
some of the direct or indirect chal-
lenges to long-accepted human rights  
 
                                                 
3  See for instance Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, The 
Carter Center, etc. 
standards (such as the Geneva con-
vention on the treatment of prisoners 
of war) have been made by the gov-
ernments that have been at the fore-
front of efforts to establish these as 
international standards and obliga-
tions on behalf of all states. Coupled 
with a greater reluctance on behalf of 
governments to criticize others’ do-
mestic policies, this has led to a tilting 
of the balance at the expense of hu-
man rights and freedoms.  
A multitude of questions arise: 
how do we define security today? 
What creates security? What consti-
tutes a threat to security? Whose secu-
rity is at stake? How should security 
threats be handled? And, at what 
cost? Against this background, it be-
comes relevant to explore the rela-
tionship between human rights and 
security and to focus in particular on 
the way in which this is expressed in 
the EU’s Security Strategy. The Euro-
pean Security Strategy is studied be-
cause it constitutes the most struc-
tured and formal declaration of the 
EU Member States’ common under-
standing of security and of challenges 
to security. 
To this intent, the paper first 
briefly examines the expanded defini-
tion of security and then turns to the 
relationship between human rights 
and human security. In the last sec-
tion, it focuses specifically on the EU’s 
Security Strategy as expressed in the 
document proposed by High-
Representative for CFSP Javier Solana 
“A secure Europe in a better world” 
and adopted by the European Council 





2. The Expanding Definition of Security 
Security has been a dynamic 
field of study, particularly since the 
end of the Cold War. The study of 
security has been expanded through 
constructivist, post-modernist, neo-
realist, environmentalist and gender 
schools of thought and especially 
from strategic and peace studies. Tra-
ditionally associated with interna-
tional relations studies and in particu-
lar with strategic studies, it has in-
creasingly concentrated on what a 
broader understanding of security 
entails, on how security is defined in 
terms of what it means to be secure, 
on whose security is at stake, on what 
is at stake, and on what one is to be 
secured from (Walker 1997). 
At its most basic level, security 
involves survival in the face of an ac-
tual or perceived threat to the refer-
ent. Traditionally, the referent has 
been the state, and military means 
have been the main means through 
which to ensure security. Threats to 
security have usually been considered 
in terms of threat to national sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, etc. In re-
cent years, alternative understandings 
of security have gained ground. Thus, 
the referent may be the state, but also 
the nation, a social group, a commu-
nity, a family or an individual. By the 
same token, the security agenda has 
been broadened beyond the strict fo-
cus of state and national security to 
focus on individuals, communities, or 
the international collectivity. In paral-
lel, it has moved away from tradition-
ally military issues, epitomised by 
nuclear security, to encompass issues 
of economic well-being, cultural iden-
tity, human and civic rights, and envi-
ronmental concerns.  
The expansion of the concept of 
security has developed in parallel 
with the wider twentieth-century 
academic debate that has strength-
ened the cosmopolitan conception of 
humans as members of the global 
community and holders of rights irre-
spective of geographic, political, so-
cial, ethnic, class, racial or other con-
siderations (Vincent 1986 and 1992; 
Held 1995; Ruggie 1993 and 1998). 
Whereas in the case of the state, the 
security criterion is sovereignty, in the 
case of the individual and of society, 
the security criterion tends to be iden-
tity (Wæver 1995) and the fulfillment 
of socio-economic rights and needs.  
Interestingly, certain aspects of 
this expanded definition of security 
have been willingly embraced by in-
ternational organisations such as the 
UN since the early 1990s, with the 
UNDP dedicating its Human Devel-
opment Report to ‘New Dimensions 
of Security’ in 1994. Since this report, 
emphasis has been placed on support-
ing a sustainable development model 
in order to ensure peace, stability and 
security in the Third World. And, ef-
forts have been directed towards rec-
ognising that people’s security is not 
limited to protection of borders or 
military might but that ‘human secu-
rity’ is equally understood as encom-
passing economic security, income 
security, health security, food secu-
rity, personal security, community 
security, environmental security and 
security from crime and terrorism. In 
these cases, the threats are unem-
ployment, disease, hunger, crime, so-
cial conflict, political repression and 
environmental hazards.  
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Threats to security, whether ex-
istential or perceived, may thus be 
traditional in nature or ‘modern.’ The 
latter category basically refers to 
threats that do not target the state (i.e. 
its territorial integrity, its borders and 
sovereignty) but constitute a threat to 
human security (i.e. the people). This 
encompasses terrorism, proliferation 
of WMD and failed states, and cannot 
be addressed by purely military 
means since the root causes fall well 
outside the realm of the military. At 
the same time, the scope of such 
threats currently cannot only be ad-
dressed by civil agencies and neces-
sarily require responses that are also 
military in nature (Paulaskas 2005).  
In all cases, however, security is 
associated with peace, stability, the 
absence of violence or even more 
broadly, the absence of threat. At the 
same time the notion of ‘soft-security’ 
has emerged in parallel, or in contrast, 
to hard security concerns. Soft secu-
rity refers to issues that are mainly of 
a non-military nature and that require 
political and economic co-operation in 
order to be addressed. With regard to 
the European continent, soft-security 
risks have included political and eco-
nomic instability, ethnic and religious 
conflict, minority rights, immigration, 
refugee and asylum issues, environ-
mental concerns, organised crime and 
trafficking.  
The policy implications of this 
expanded, or even enriched, defini-
tion of security is that it becomes the 
core, underlying motivation for the 
formulation and implementation of a 
foreign policy that encourages de-
mocratisation and the rule of law, that 
condemns violations of human rights, 
and that even intervenes to protect 
human rights. Intervention may take 
a multitude of forms ranging from 
diplomatic criticism to sanctions or 
forcible humanitarian intervention. 
Emanuel Adler’s definition of security 
within international relations is ap-
propriate in this context. Adler has 
defined security as: “‘comprehensive’ (it 
links classic security elements to eco-
nomic, environmental, cultural, and 
human rights factors), ‘indivisible’ (one 
state’s security is inseparable from 
that of other states), and ‘cooperative’ 
(security is based on confidence and 
cooperation, the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, and the work of mutually 
reinforcing multilateral institutions)” 
(Adler 1998: 119-120). These concep-
tual dimensions of security are re-
flected in practice in the EU’s under-
standing of security and constitute the 
guiding principles of Europe’s Secu-
rity Strategy that may be considered 
as the most important text defining 
the goals and foundations of Europe’s 
common foreign and security policy 
to date. 
 
3. Human Security and Human Rights 
Given that human beings are at the 
epicentre of the broadened concept of se-
curity it is relevant to consider the rela-
tionship and connections that exist be-
tween human security and human rights. 
The Commission on Human Secu-
rity (CHS) defines human security as the 
protection of “the vital core of all human 
lives in ways that enhance human free-
doms and fulfilment”. Human security 
has been identified as being universal, its 
components are inter-dependent, it is best 
assured through prevention and it is peo-




2002). It has also been argued that it is 
complementary to state security as it fur-
thers human development and enhances 
human rights (Commission on Human 
Security Report 2003). Human security 
signifies protecting fundamental free-
doms, protecting people from critical 
threats, conflicts and deprivations, and 
providing the opportunity for people to 
build on their strengths and aspirations to 
achieve their full potential. Thus, human 
security involves a mutually reinforcing 
relation between protection and empow-
erment. In the academic corner, it has 
prompted research on the inter-connected 
dimensions of the expanded notion of 
security, development and human rights. 
In the policy-making corner, it has been 
officially incorporated in the foreign poli-
cies of Canada, Norway and Japan and it 
is at the epicentre of the UNDP’s activities 
while it is also taken up by the World 
Bank. 
The UNDP’s formulation of human 
security, which is also perhaps the broad-
est and most all-encompassing, comprises 
the following core dimensions of security: 
• personal and physical security (such 
as the right of individuals and 
communities to preserve life, 
health and dwell in a safe and 
sustainable environment); 
• economic security  (including ac-
cess to employment and to the 
resources necessary for one's own 
existence, improvements in the 
material quality of life, etc); 
• social security  (for instance pro-
viding protection from discrimi-
nation based on age, gender, eth-
nicity, social status, freedom to 
associate, etc); 
• political security (invoking the 
right to representation, participa-
tion and dissent as well as the 
empowerment to make choices 
and being able to effect change. 
This also involves the right to re-
course to justice); 
• and ethnic and cultural security 
(which involves a social climate 
in which minority populations or 
special groups feel secure in ex-
pressing their identity, their 
characteristics and needs). 
 
These seven dimensions cover 
practically all aspects of human activ-
ity and therefore risk having their im-
portance diluted from a policy-
relevant approach. Thus, a more con-
crete definition has been sought, and 
in effect, a more tangible perspective 
was as outlined in the Report by the 
Commission on Human Security.4 It is 
proposed that human security is rele-
vant to address threats faced by peo-
ple in the following circumstances: 
• It involves protecting people in 
violent conflict, particularly 
given that civilians are the main 
casualties in conflicts. Integrated 
strategies that combine political, 
military, humanitarian and de-
velopment considerations are re-
quired in this context to end hu-
man rights violations and pro-
vide humanitarian assistance 
where needed; 
• It also involves protecting and 
empowering people in post-
conflict situations where recon-
struction, reconciliation, stabilisa-
tion and setting up functioning, 
legitimate and efficient institu-
tions are necessary for rebuilding 
stability and security within these 
societies; 
• It equally involves protecting and 
empowering people undergoing 
                                                 
4  The Commission on Human Security (CHS) 
was established with the initiative of the Gov-
ernment of Japan and in response to the UN 
Secretary-General’s call at the 2000 Millennium 
Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of 
fear.” It is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees and 
Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of 
Trinity College, Cambridge. (http://www.  
humansecurity-chs.org)  
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migration, whether this is cross-
border or internal. It is relevant 
for refugees, asylum-seekers and 
internally displaced persons just 
as much as it involves persons 
migrating to escape natural disas-
ters or seeking an opportunity to 
improve their situation; 
• Related to this is the issue of eco-
nomic insecurity caused by ex-
treme poverty. Human security 
entails efficient and equitable 
trade arrangements, and eco-
nomic growth that extends to all 
segments of society and that of-
fers a system of social protection; 
• This in turn is intricately con-
nected with health and educa-
tion. Conditions of insecurity, 
poverty and conflict are the main 
root causes of ill-health and inef-
ficient health systems unable to 
deal with global infectious dis-
eases and poverty-related health 
deprivations. At the same time, 
basic education and knowledge 
are the cornerstones of human se-
curity, not only because they em-
power people to achieve their as-
pirations, but also because they 
provide them with the skills to 
protect themselves from other 
threats to security (for example, 
by offering health education, or 
teaching respect and tolerance for 
diversity, etc.). 
All of the above dimensions of 
human security acquire authoritative 
relevance and even a commanding 
obligation to be respected and pro-
tected because of the fundamental 
nature of human rights and freedoms. 
The Human Security Commission 
undertook the task of tying human 
security to human rights to the advan-
tage of both.  
In effect, it has suggested that 
by placing human security in the con-
text of human rights it strengthens 
correlative duties. Correlative duties 
are attached to practically all human 
rights and these basically involve the 
following: the duty of respecting a 
particular right and refraining from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the 
right; the duty of protecting from the 
violation of rights by state authorities 
or other actors; the duty to promote 
rights, which entails raising public 
awareness and providing the neces-
sary procedures for the rights to be 
asserted and protected; and finally, 
the duty of the state to take appropri-
ate measures towards the full realisa-
tion of the right. Furthermore, these 
duties are both positive (in that they 
relate to the need to undertake spe-
cific tasks to meet these duties) and 
negative (given that in certain cases 
they require the non-intervention of 
state or other authorities). But in all 
cases, these issues require policy re-
sponses, and most of all they require 
concerted policy responses between 
countries and with international or-
ganisations and civil society actors.  
By the same token, it can 
equally be argued that human secu-
rity can reinforce human rights on 
policy-makers’ agenda for a number 
of reasons. This is by no means an 
exhaustive account; it merely aims at 
pointing out five arguments that may 
be particularly influential:  
First, human security can re-
strain the degree of state discretion in 
the realisation of rights. From this 
perspective, it is suggested that by 
attributing to human security the 
same importance as national security, 
respect for human rights and national 
security arguments no longer need to 
be balanced since these become com-
plementary. Thus, the questions of 
choosing between security and rights, 




ties, become irrelevant. Second, it may 
strengthen the pace and intensity at 
which states are required to address 
the social and economic rights of their 
people. In effect, social and economic 
rights are often subject to a progres-
sive realisation approach providing 
state authorities with a wide leeway 
and limited pressure to undertake the 
necessary reforms and measures. 
Given that under-development and 
extreme poverty have been identified 
as being among the root causes of 
most contemporary threats and chal-
lenges to human security (regardless 
of whether this takes the form of mi-
gration, epidemics, civil unrest, ter-
rorism, environmental degradation, 
etc), it makes it a more pressing con-
cern to respect of the second genera-
tion of human rights Third, human 
security can provide the framework 
within which different sets and cate-
gories of human rights may cease to 
be considered as conflicting (particu-
larly regarding first and second gen-
eration rights) and through which 
their indivisibility and inter-
dependence can be reinforced. Fourth, 
human security makes the need for 
humanitarian intervention on the  
 
grounds of serious human rights vio-
lations more pressing, though it also 
extends the debate on whether, to 
what extent and at what stage force 
ought to be used for the purpose of 
protecting human rights. Fifth, hu-
man security expands the notion of 
threats to human rights and of who 
can perpetrate these violations, 
thereby widening the scope to include 
non-state actors and private entities.  
For all the enthusiasm that 
‘human security’ has triggered, it has 
raised just as much criticism. It has 
been contested for its theoretical inco-
herence, its scope, the difficulty in 
measuring it, and its utility, since it is 
argued that it cannot meaningfully be 
reflected in practice and that more 
often than not it raises false hopes (see 
Oberleitner 2003). Nonetheless, its 
influence within UN agencies and 
within specific sectors (for instance 
regarding land-mines, small arms, the 
ICC, development cooperation, etc) is 
not inconsiderable. Equally significant 
is the extent to which the dimensions 
of human security can be found in the 
EU’s formal definition of how it un-
derstands its common security. 
 
4. A Secure Europe in a Better World 
From a policy-relevant perspec-
tive, the academic debate relating to 
the proliferation of referent objects 
and of threats, or of perceived threats, 
has been particularly pertinent as re-
gards the formulation or re-
formulations of countries’ foreign and 
security policies. The relationship be-
tween this expanded conceptualisa-
tion of security and human rights is 
relevant for foreign policy-making, 
not just to be able to identify the root 
causes of its security challenges, but 
equally to be able to ascertain the 
most appropriate means and instru-
ments to achieve greater security.  
Javier Solana’s A Secure Europe 
in a Better World reflects these recent 
trends since it attempts to refer to se-
curity both at the state level and at the 
human level (i.e. individual/ commu-
nity), while taking into account both 
hard and soft security issues. This text 
is an effort to formalize the place se-
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curity holds in the EU’s world-view of 
international relations, and the ways 
in which the EU considers it can con-
tribute to global and regional security. 
It thus acknowledges that the EU is a 
security-maker, a security provider, 
and it also recognizes the need to en-
hance its instruments and priorities 
across various fields in order to be 
able to respond effectively and effi-
ciently to the current challenges to 
security in all levels. The question of 
whether and to what extent it suc-
ceeds in accomplishing these is be-
yond the scope of this paper. 
What is argued in this paper is 
that the EU Security Strategy goes a 
long way in terms of making human 
security an inextricable dimension of 
national/European security and 
thereby bringing the respect and pro-
tection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms to the centre of the EU’s 
understanding of security. 
It is necessary, however, to go a 
step back in order to provide the 
wider framework within which the 
EU Security Strategy was adopted, 
since a number of exogenous and en-
dogenous factors determined the need 
to stipulate a common security strat-
egy, and ultimately its content. 
4.1 Adopting the EU Security 
Strategy 
The National Security Strategy, 
published in 2002, provided a clear 
picture of the way in which the US 
perceived threats to global, regional 
and national security and also out-
lined its response to these threats, 
thereby opening the debate on ‘pre-
emptive strikes.’ The war against Iraq 
that eventually followed in 2003 
unleashed a series of internal crises 
and clashes in Europe and in its 
transatlantic partnership. These two 
events made evident that at the EU 
level there was no clear definition of 
what constitutes a threat to national 
and global security; and, that there 
was no common approach with re-
gard to the preferred means and in-
struments through which to address 
current security challenges.  Common 
strategies for particular regions (i.e. 
Southeast Europe, or Russia) had 
been drafted, yet still, a full decade 
after Maastricht during which the EU 
had been declaring a Common For-
eign and Security Policy, the Union 
and its Member States lacked the most 
fundamental element: a formal set of 
common strategic objectives.  
This gap was not only damag-
ing for the EU’s identity and credibil-
ity on the international scene, it was 
also harmful to the sense of mutually 
shared values that exist within the EU 
security community (cf. Adler, Rug-
gie). The United Kingdom, France and 
Germany set the High Representative 
for the CFSP with the task of drafting 
a European Security Strategy to ad-
dress this gap (Cameron 2004). Thus, 
an EU institution – in this particular 
case, the High Representative for the 
CFSP – was attributed the responsibil-
ity of serving as a mediator and facili-
tator between the Member States' per-
ceptions of security challenges and 
preferred means to address these in 
order to produce a policy output that 
would reflect the EU’s values and its 
definition of security. This basically 
involved ‘codifying’ the existing EU 
‘acquis’ relating to the EU Member 
States’ understanding of security; fa-
cilitating the identification of common 
strategic goals; providing the plat-
form for further consensus, thereby 
setting an additional foundation for a 
common European foreign policy; 





In effect, in June 2003 at the 
Thessaloniki Summit, Javier Solana, 
High Representative for the CFSP put 
forward a first text with a series of 
recommendations for a secure Europe 
in a better world. During the six-
month period that followed, an at-
tempt at a public debate on foreign 
and security policy was instigated 
especially to obtain the input of other 
non-state actors (i.e. think-tanks, and 
representatives of epistemic commu-
nities). The EU Institute for Security 
Studies invited experts to three semi-
nars held in Rome, Paris and Stock-
holm to discuss the proposed text. On 
12th December 2003, the revised 
document proposed by Javier Solana 
was adopted by the Heads of State 
and Government at the European 
Council in Brussels. Commonly re-
ferred to as the European Security 
Strategy, this document constitutes a 
succinct assessment of global security 
challenges and key threats as per-
ceived by the EU and its Member 
States. Moreover, it identifies the EU’s 
strategic objectives, and proposes a 
series of policy implications for the 
Union.5
The European Security Strategy 
was welcomed by most as an encour-
aging initiative, and even as a ‘tri-
umph of hope over experience’ (Wal-
lace, Financial Times, 27 June 2003). 
Given the severe rift in transatlantic 
relations over the war against Iraq 
and the split between European gov-
ernments (including EU member 
states and the accession states) in two 
bitterly opposing camps, this initia-
tive was an undisputed accomplish-
ment. It provided an opportunity for 
a consensus on the EU’s long-term 
                                                 
5  Solana J., A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. The full 
text can be downloaded from: 
http://ue.eu.int/solana/list.asp?BID=111.  
security goals between the EU Mem-
ber States not only at a time of global 
crisis, but also at a turning point for 
Europe given that the fifth enlarge-
ment, creating the EU of twenty-five 
Member States, was coming up. 
4.2 The Main Dimensions 
of the EU Security 
Strategy 
In response to the new interna-
tional environment, five key threats 
for the EU and its Member States 
were identified by the High Represen-
tative for the CFSP (European Security 
Strategy, 2003): 
• terrorism – this is considered as 
a strategic threat to the whole of 
Europe, emphasis is placed on 
terrorism at the global scale 
linked to violent religious ex-
tremism; Europe is seen as both 
a target and a base for such ter-
rorism, thereby making con-
certed action indispensable; 
• the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction – technological ad-
vances have made WMD in-
creasingly dangerous and the 
potential for an arms race in the  
Middle East is presented as par-
ticularly disconcerting, as is the 
risk of terrorist groups acquir-
ing WMD; 
• regional conflicts - regardless of 
whether these are close to 
Europe’s borders or far away, 
violent or frozen conflicts 
threaten human rights, social 
and physical infrastructures and 
regional stability overall, while 
providing fertile ground for ex-
tremism, terrorism, state failure, 
organized crime and even an 
arms race for WMD; 
• state failure – bad governance, 
corruption, weak institutions 
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and lack of accountability, 
abuse of power and civil conflict 
erode the state and its institu-
tions, leaving the ground free 
for organized crime and terror-
ist groups; 
• organized crime – activities range 
from illegal migration to drugs, 
trafficking in humans and 
weapons and constitute one of 
the prime challenges for 
Europe’s borders. 
These global threats are per-
ceived to be interdependent and mu-
tually reinforcing, and when consid-
ered in combination, constitute a radi-
cal threat to regional stability and to 
European security. 
Three strategic objectives are 
singled out in order for the European 
Union ‘to defend its security and to 
promote its values’ (10: 2003) while 
also sharing ‘in the responsibility for 
global security and in building a bet-
ter world.’(4: 2003). These three objec-
tives are outlined in the document as 
follows: 
First, the EU must continue to 
be active in addressing these key 
threats. Conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early, and 
none of the new threats is purely mili-
tary, nor can it be tackled by purely 
military means. In this, it is argued, 
the EU and its Member States are 
well-equipped, with both military and 
especially non-military means at their 
disposal. Second, the EU must build 
security in its neighbourhood. As the 
EU has enlarged, it has come closer to 
regions of frozen or latent conflicts or 
regions that were recently engaged in 
violent conflict. The core task is to 
promote ‘a ring of well governed 
countries to the East of the European 
Union and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean with whom we can 
enjoy close and cooperative rela-
tions.’(13: 2003) Making sure that no 
new dividing lines are created along 
the European continent, particularly 
as regards the Balkans, resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and engaging in a 
broader engagement with the Arab 
world are at the core of this effort. The 
third strategic objective is to promote 
an international order based on effec-
tive multilateralism. In effect, in the 
document adopted by the Heads of 
State and Government of the EU 
Member States, it is underlined that 
‘the development of a stronger inter-
national society, well functioning in-
ternational institutions and a rule-
based international order is our objec-
tive.’ (14: 2003) Naturally, the UN and 
the UN Security Council are accorded 
central importance, as are the main 
international organizations, while the 
transatlantic partnership, and particu-
larly the NATO dimension, are pre-
sented as the principal pillars of this 
system. It is also noted that based on 
its own experience, security can be 
increased through confidence build-
ing and arms control regimes between 
well-governed democratic states. It is 
thus re-stated that the best means of 
strengthening the international order 
is to spread good governance, support 
social and political reform, establish 
the rule of law and protect human 
rights. And, the EU is well placed to 
contribute in a very significant man-
ner to this through its trade and de-
velopment policies, through assis-
tance programmes and its condition-
ality criteria.  
To be more effective, however, 
the text concludes that the EU needs 
to be more active in pursuing the stra-
tegic objectives (particularly regard-
ing preventive engagement), more 
capable (by systematically pooling 
civilian and military resources in 
more efficient and flexible ways while 




fence capabilities of the member states 
in combination with the EU institu-
tions), more coherent (both in terms of 
instruments and capabilities) and 
work in developing closer partner-
ships with those who share common 
values and goals with the EU. 
4.3 To What Extent does the 
European Security Strategy 
Incorporate Human 
Security? 
It is contended here that the 
European Security Strategy lies within 
the evolution that has increasingly 
characterized the EU’s foreign policy 
both with regard to its priorities 
(Smith 1998), and with regard to the 
role the EU institutions have played 
in institutionalizing the triptych of 
democracy, human rights and rule of 
law in the EU’s external scope of ac-
tion. 
First of all it reflects a wider 
understanding of what constitutes 
core threats to European security. The 
European Security Strategy reflects 
the shift from an exclusively military 
conception of security to one encom-
passing social and economic inequali-
ties, non-traditional security threats or 
‘soft security’ challenges. Second, it 
indicates the shift that has taken place 
with regard to how security chal-
lenges ought to be faced and handled. 
In effect, military alliances and bal-
ance of power tactics are no longer 
considered sufficient; rather increas-
ing institutionalization of relations in 
multilateral fora and institutions and 
legally binding agreements are pre-
ferred, leading towards a more ‘coop-
erative’ approach to security. Finally, 
it reiterates the position that interna-
tional order is fundamentally based 
on the respect for human rights and 
freedoms.  
The text addresses the threats 
posed by terrorism and proliferation 
of WMD and identifies these as top 
priorities, but strengthening the inter-
national rule-based order according to 
the principles of multilateralism, co-
operation between partners, and the 
core role of international and regional 
institutions are ranked just as highly. 
This underlines the core messages of 
the European Security Strategy: that 
no single country is able to tackle to-
day’s complex problems on its own; 
and from a more normative perspec-
tive that the EU aims at contributing 
to an effective multilateral system 
leading to a fairer, safer and more 
united world. The EU’s formalized 
support for multilateralism and the 
declaration of intent to take on greater 
responsibility and action so as to carry 
greater political weight is in rhetorical 
terms an illustration of its gradual 
willingness to promote its world-view 
on international relations and its con-
ception of security on the global 
scene.  
The text is a statement of objec-
tives, values and strategic guidelines. 
It does not spell out the details of how 
the EU can be more active, more effec-
tive, more capable or more coherent; 
nor does it refer to the particular roles 
of the EU institutions. Given the cur-
rent period of reflection following the 
French and Dutch referenda results 
on the European Constitutional 
Treaty and its uncertain future this is 
probably a good thing since it does 
not require a revisiting of its policy 
recommendations, which are suffi-
ciently general in nature and scope to 
continue to be relevant. 
The importance of the text that 
was drafted by the High Representa-
tive is that it succeeded in synthesiz-
ing the common security concerns 
and strategic objectives of the EU 
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Member States at a time when the 
definition of what constitutes a threat 
to international and human security 
and in which instances military force 
is the most appropriate means of ad-
dressing it certainly did not have an 
evident answer. Internally, its value is 
fundamental since it constitutes an 
important reference point in the ef-
forts to establish a more credible and 
substantial common EU foreign and 
security policy and strives to achieve 
more coherence while urging for 
closer cooperation. Internationally, its 
value is just as important, if not more, 
since it constitutes a clear and succinct 
presentation of the security concerns 
that the EU has prioritized, of the fac-
tors that the Union considers to be 
conducive to instability and insecu-
rity, and of the political role it aspires 
to fulfill in order to contribute to 
global peace, prosperity and security. 
In terms of rhetoric, the text achieves 
its purpose. The promotion of 
Europe’s common values - namely, 
respect for democracy, human rights, 
rule of law, market economy, solidar-
ity, sustainable development - ap-
pears inbuilt in its understanding of 
security and the scope of its Security 
Strategy. What remains is to see the 
ways in which this Security Strategy 
will eventually be implemented. 
Precisely this question was at 
the core of the Barcelona Report of the  
Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities. The report was pre-
sented to the High Representative in 
September 2004 and proposed a Hu-
man Security Doctrine for Europe in 
order to provide the EU with the ca-




outlines  a series of seven principles 
according to which the ESS should 
develop, namely: the primacy of hu-
man rights, clear political authority, 
multilateralism, a bottom-up ap-
proach, regional focus, the use of legal 
instruments and the appropriate use 
of force. And it posits that for its im-
plementation it requires an integrated 
set of civil-military capabilities that 
would be suited to carrying out hu-
man security operations and a legal 
framework that underpins the deci-
sions to intervene. The report admits 
that the ESS ought to be grounded in 
pragmatism since the EU’s capacity 
for operational missions is limited, as 
is in many cases the political will to 
carry them out. Nonetheless, it offers 
detailed description of the technical 
requirements of the Human Security 
Response Force it proposes, since it 
argues that the EU’s critical interest is 
in developing capabilities that can 
contribute to global human security, 
which is inextricably linked to the 
security of Europeans. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Respect for human rights has 
generally been associated with respect 
for the rule of law and democratic 
governance. And, this triptyph has 
come to be considered as one of the 
core foundations for internal stability  
and prosperity, and for international 
peace and security. Security in this 
context encompasses human security 
and consequently requires respect 
and protection of individual and mi-




Today, the protection and pro-
motion of human rights are consid-
ered legitimate objectives of foreign 
policy. This has not been limited to 
diplomatic declarations or public 
condemnations of human rights viola-
tions. It has also been articulated 
through (forcible) humanitarian in-
terventions, human rights condition-
ality clauses to trade and/or associa-
tion agreements, development co-
operation and technical assistance 
programmes, etc. The promotion of 
human rights concerns and democ-
ratic principles in foreign policy is a 
continuous process. It is not a one-off 
decision or policy output, but an ob-
jective that is best seen as an on-going 
process, where competing interests, 
understandings and priorities are ac-
commodated, and where policies and 
instruments are remodelled based on 
the changing situations and demands 
stemming from the domestic and in-
ternational environments. At the mo-
ment, in the post-9/11 world where 
the core security threats are identified 
in rogue and failed states, terrorism, 
WMD and organised crime, the pro-
tection of human rights is necessarily 
modelled in response to these. It is, 
however, important to not disregard 
the multiplicity of inter-linked issues 
(poverty, the pressures of modernisa-
tion, social and cultural alienation of 
some population groups in foreign 
societies, political crises, etc) that con-
stitute the root causes of many of 
these modern security threats, since it 
is these that must ultimately be ad-
dressed. It is just as important to 
avoid the pitfall of addressing these 
security threats at the expense of do-
mestic civil liberties. Striking the bal-
ance with regard to this tension is one 
of the EU’s major challenges, since it 
will influence the quality of democ-
racy within the Member States as well 
as its moral authority in international 
affairs and hence its leverage in pres-
suring others to adhere to interna-
tional norms and standards and in 
democracy promotion. 
The expansion of the security 
concept has rendered sustainable se-
curity a core policy objective. In view 
of the increasing inter-dependencies 
between sectors, functions, states, 
economies, peoples, and civil societies 
that have characterised the world 
since the twentieth century, it has 
been argued that sustainable security 
can best be achieved through coali-
tions, through collective actions, 
through mutual and common ap-
proaches and solutions. It is a com-
mon approach to ‘hard security’ that 
was the foundation for the EEC, and 
then the EU, and which has led to un-
precedented attempts to orchestrate a 
common security and defence policy 
among the Member States (CFSP, 
ESDP). It is equally cross-border co-
operation and concerted action at the 
supranational level on soft security 
issues (relating to economic develop-
ment, social cohesion and civil society 
building) through functioning, legiti-
mate institutions and democratic 
processes at the national level that 
were the foundation of the European 
security community. And, it is to this 
security community that the candi-
date neighbouring countries, or aspir-
ing candidate countries and their 
people wish to adhere. It is a security 
provider not only for the accession, or 
aspiring candidate neighbouring 
countries, but for a significant number 
of countries around the world 
through its development co-
operation, through its technical assis-
tance programmes, and through the 
moral weight and its influence in in-
ternational affairs when it does put 
forward a common, united position. 
Thus, the European Security Strategy 
and its emphasis on promoting multi-
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and consolidating democratic institu-
tions and governance in post-
authoritarian countries; its track re-
cord probably includes some of the 
most successful cases of ‘regime 
change’ that have been achieved 
through constructive conditionality 
and linkages between reforms and 
benefits. It should thus not limit itself 
to ‘preventive engagement’  and by 
further underpinning the European 
Security Strategy with the proposed 
Human Security Doctrine there exists 
a wide scope for furthering respect 
and protection of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms while addressing 
global and regional security chal-
lenges.  
lateralism in a rule-based interna-
tional order inevitably reflects this. 
The challenge lies in the extent to 
which the EU will be effective, com-
mitted and strong-willed enough to 
promote this model of security-
building further in international rela-
tions. 
The EU has a distinctive per-
ception of democratic governance and 
of security in inter-state relations. It is 
based on multilateralism, integration, 
co-operation, respect for international 
law and solidarity. This is currently 
expressed within the European Secu-
rity Strategy in a very clear manner. 
The EU also has an undeniably rich 
experience in promoting democracy  
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Europe Takes On Human Security 
P. H. Liotta/Taylor Owen 
 
 
“The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact 
 that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions 
 of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, 
we have still not found Peace or Security.” 
Winston Churchill 
 
Europe, as identity and union, 
has undergone an extraordinary 
transformation since the end of Cold 
War. In recent history, much of this 
remarkable change has only acceler-
ated, both with the expansion of 
membership in the European Union, a 
growing independence in terms of 
foreign policy, and an emerging rec-
ognition that disagreements about 
Europe’s future and identity are inevi-
table. Nonetheless, as J. Peter Burgess 
has aptly summarized, a major Euro-
pean shift regarding the concept of 
security is underway. With Solana’s 
Thessaloniki Summit document “A 
Secure Europe in a Better World”, 
Burgess argues, the European com-
munity of values is being transformed 
into a security community.1 That this 
shift has embraced the concept of 
                                                 
                                                
1  Drawn from an abstract of a presentation at 
the Pell Center for International Relations and 
Public Policy, titled “Culture Wars? War Is 
already a Culture,” December 6th, 2004, at a 
workshop titled “Prepared for Peace? The Use 
and Abuse of ‘Culture’ in Military Simulations, 
Training and Education.” Burgess refers to the 
work by Mary Kaldor (1999) “New and Old 
Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era”. 
Notably, Kaldor was the instrumental force 
between the creation and production of “A 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Bar-
celona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities”. 
human security makes it all the more 
significant. While the concept has re-
ceived attention on the margins of 
international affairs, it has yet to 
guide the foreign policy of a major 
international actor. A European hu-
man security foreign policy would 
therefore offer a fascinating test of the 
‘New Security’ which proponents of 
the concept have been advocating. 
Reflecting this shift, the docu-
ment “A Secure Europe in a Better 
World” – most commonly known as 
the European Security Strategy – stands 
in somewhat notable contrast to the 
September 17, 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America. 
Specifically, the European Union 
strategy emphasizes the notion of co-
operative engagement, relying on the 
strength of 450 million members and 
the recognition that no one country – 
perhaps in direct contrast to the U.S. 
national strategy – can “go it alone.” 
Although the concept of “sharing he-
gemony” between the U.S. and 
Europe seems immensely sensible, 
reality equally dictates that this shar-
ing is unlikely to occur in the near 
future.2
 
2  For the best argument in favor of such an 
approach, see Schweiss (2003) 
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The purpose of this essay is not 
expressly to detail the chronology, 
conceptual development, and evolu-
tion of European defense policy. Yet, 
with the publication of the European 
Security Strategy in 2003 and with the 
subsequent 2004 publication of A 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe:  
The Barcelona Report of the Study Group 
on Europe’s Security Capabilities, the EU 
has declared inherent security values 
in both promoting the rights of na-
tion-states and in protecting the rights 
of individual citizens. The EU has also 
provided a proposed force planning 
structure to support these values. 
 
1. A Human Security Dilemma 
Human security may rest un-
comfortably on the horns of a di-
lemma. While middle power advo-
cates of the concept push for its in-
creased acceptance in the interna-
tional community, the sheer broad-
ness of the concept provides little 
guidance for how the term is to be 
used – for what human security pol-
icy might look like. This difficulty is 
highlighted by contrasting middle 
power versus European and Ameri-
can use of human security ideas. 
While the effort to promote 
human security in the arena of “high 
politics” on the part of the Canadian 
and Norwegian governments since 
the 1990s is well known, there is a 
tempting sense of proselytizing right-
eousness as well. Such so-called 
“middle power” states, after all, can 
exercise significant moral clout by 
emphasizing that the rights of the in-
dividual are at least as important as 
protecting the territorial and sover-
eign integrity of the state. Yet when 
larger powers, particularly those with 
significant militaries (such as the 
United States or the United Kingdom) 
advocate similar positions, it is their 
overwhelming power that is recog-
nized, respected, and resented.  
On the one hand, what is per-
ceived as the “moral clout” of the 
middle power is sensed as “hegem-
ony unbridled” when it is empha-
sized in an attempted similar fashion 
by major powers. On the other hand, 
when actions taken in the name, or in 
the principled following, of human 
security do occur, they are often inex-
tricably linked to issues that are em-
bedded in the more traditional con-
cepts of “national security” and pro-
tection of the state. Idealism thus be-
comes enmeshed in realism; actions 
taken on behalf of the powerless are 
determined only by the powerful. Ac-
cordingly, we witness 150,000 Ameri-
can forces deployed to Iraq in 2003 
but only six communication com-
mand and control specialists initially 
put ashore in Liberia to support Nige-
rian peacekeepers in stability and se-
curity operations. Nominally, both 
scenarios involve regime change and 
stabilizing regional security – as well 
as intervention for the protection of 
citizens abused by the state. Yet the 
physical and economic geography of 
Iraq place it at the center of a region 
declared “vital” to U.S. interests, 
awash in petroleum and natural gas 
resources. National security interests, 
in the form of geopolitics, again 
trumps the intervention priority list. 
Moreover, the alleged bellicosity of 
the former Iraqi regime, particularly 
regarding potential or actual posses-
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sion of weapons of mass destruction, 
clearly supported more traditional 
national security interests such as de-
fense of the homeland and protection 
of one’s territory from attack. Liberia, 
while clearly a regional troublemaker, 
never posed a “threat” to the United 
States or any of its close allies. (Make 
no mistake: it was a brutal, authoritar-
ian regime that threatened its own 
people as well as the entire security 
architecture of West Africa but re-
mained little more than a perceived 
peripheral threat for many) 
Undoubtedly, increasing num-
bers now speak out on behalf of what 
the International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty has 
termed the “responsibility to protect”: 
the suggestion of six criteria for inter-
national humanitarian intervention to 
enforce the principle of individual 
security that sovereign states owe to 
their citizens. While the ICISS com-
mission stresses the importance of UN 
security council authorization, there is 
potential risk in their proposition - 
that the “responsibility to protect” 
might enable the “right to intervene.” 
In the topology of power, dominant 
states may continue to intervene at 
the time and place of their choosing. 
The ICISS guidelines are helpful, but 
further clarity is vital to mitigate 
against unilateral intervention. 
While there has been an unde-
niable political rift between the 
United States and the EU since the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, Kagan notes  
what is arguably a deeper, ideological 
separation concerning the relation 
between state sovereignty and secu-
rity:  
“The fact remains that Kosovo war was ille-
gal, and not only because it lacked Security 
Council authorization: Serbia had not com-
mitted any aggression against another state 
but was slaughtering its own ethnic Albanian 
population. The intervention therefore vio-
lated the sovereign equality of all nations, a 
cardinal principle – of the UN Charter and 
the bedrock principle of international law for 
centuries. During the Kosovo conflict, Henry 
Kissinger warned that “the abrupt aban-
donment of the concept of national sover-
eignty” risked unmooring the world from 
any notion of order, legal or otherwise. Many 
Europeans rejected this complaint at the 
time. Back then […] before the Iraq war […] 
they did not seem to believe that interna-
tional legitimacy resided exclusively with the 
Security Council, or in the UN Charter, or 
even in traditional principles of international 
law. Instead they believed in the legitimacy 
of their common postmodern moral values.” 
(Kagan 2004: 75) 
In 2003, during the dispute over 
Iraq, those postmodern values did not 
seem to be universally shared or even 
understood. Yet it is against this back-
drop that the EU chose in late 2004 to 
address a context and a justification 
for incorporating human security as a 
philosophy, if not a complete doc-
trine, worth considering. A recent EU 
effort directly takes on critics of hu-
man security, and in many ways for 
the first time moves the concept from 
a hit and miss tool of advocacy to a 
viable challenge to the traditional se-
curity paradigm. 
 
2. Europe Incorporates Human Security 
In September 2004, an inde-
pendent study group at the request of 
EU Secretary-General Javier Solana 
released ‘A Human Security Doctrine 
for Europe’ which detailed the scope, 
organization, and intent that the EU 
“should build its security policy on a 
‘human security doctrine,’ aimed at 
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protecting individuals through law-
enforcement, humanitarian assistance 
with the occasional use of force” (p 
239/04) Taking into account the need 
for complementarities in civil and 
military operations for EU missions in 
the Balkan, in the great Lakes region 
of sub-Saharan Africa, and in the 
South Caucasus, the document pro-
posed the development of a civil-
military force of 15,000 personnel, to 
include one-third civilian profession-
als who would support crisis man-
agement operations. 
Concerning this proposal, two 
notable aspects arise. First, the conve-
nor of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities was Mary Kal-
dor, author of the widely acknowl-
edged work New and Old Wars: Organ-
ized Violence in a Global Era. According 
to Kaldor,  
“Europeans cannot be secure while millions 
of people live in intolerable insecurity […] 
Where people live in lawlessness, poverty, 
exclusivist ideologies and daily violence, 
there is fertile ground for criminal networks 
and terrorism. Conflict regions export or 
transport hard drugs and guns to the Euro-
pean Union. That is why a contribution to 
global human security is now the most realis-
tic security policy for Europe.” (Glasius/Said 
2005) 
The document does not shy 
away from expressing high ambitions 
for the European Union and its capa-
bility to project force – on a global 
scale. While some observers remain 
skeptical that the EU often pro-
nounces lofty ambitions without the 
ability to integrate and organize or to 
support such a global force, A Human 
Security Doctrine for Europe may be the 
most direct document to date to so 
openly declare Europe’s responsibility 
to act independently, and, if neces-
sary, to act beyond the borders of  
Europe. Indeed, these responsi-
bilities are clearly stated: “A human 
security approach for the European 
Union means that it should contribute 
to the protection of every individual 
human being and not only on the de-
fense of the Union’s borders, as was 
the security approach of nation-
states” (Study Group on Europe’s Se-
curity Capabilities 2004: 5). 
This rationale, however, falls 
victim to one of the difficulties of any 
potential human security based for-
eign policy, namely, how direct a link 
must be made between vulnerability 
abroad and EU security. Once the 
human security doctrine is applied to 
people outside of the EU’s political 
responsibility, must they justify inter-
vention on national security grounds? 
If so, there are significant difficulties 
with relying solely on the ‘terror 
breeding ground’ argument in guid-
ing an entire foreign policy. If not, 
they will have to move beyond direct 
causal links to a more nuanced argu-
ment connecting suffering abroad to 
security at home. 
The document also presents a 
decidedly narrow definition for hu-
man security. By emphasizing “law-
enforcement with the occasional use 
of force,” the focus on human security 
remains strictly limited. However, the 
report does state that in extreme cir-
cumstances, a human security inter-
vention may be needed against the 
more egregious, non-violent threats, 
thus incorporating some aspects of 
the broader human security concep-
tualization, though notably using the 
type of threshold suggested above as 
a limiting mechanism. Generally, 
however, while the term “human se-
curity” is still evolving, the EU “doc-
trine” seems to intentionally limit it-
self to a focus on violence and how to 
stop it.3 Yet with this limiting focus, 
                                                 
3  As one anonymous reviewer noted, the EU 
document is at least much a philosophy as it is 
a doctrine. We agree. 
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the EU human security doctrine em-
phasizes legal frameworks and insti-
tutions (such as the International 
Criminal Court – which the U.S. has 
refused to recognize) and developing 
specific guidelines and criteria that 
could authorize intervention exclusive 
of UN Security Council authorization 
(Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities 2004: 20-22). While stress-
ing the need to prevent “gross human 
rights violations,” the declaration is 
quite specific in other ways regarding 
norms, expectations, and the respon-
sible commitments of states to their 
citizens: 
The [Human Security] doctrine 
[for Europe] comprises three ele-
ments: 
• “A set of seven principles for operations 
in situations of severe insecurity that 
apply to both ends and means. These 
principles are: the primacy of human 
rights, clear political authority, multilat-
eralism, a bottom-up approach, regional 
focus, the use of legal instruments, and 
the appropriate use of force. The report 
puts particular emphasis on the bottom-
up approach; on communication, con-
sultation, dialogue and partnership 
with the local population in order to 
improve early warning, intelligence 
gathering, mobilisation of local support, 
implementation and sustainability. 
• A ‘Human Security Response Force’, 
initially composed of 15,000 men and 
women, of whom at least one third 
would be civilian (police, legal experts, 
development and humanitarian special-
ists, administrators, etc.). The Force 
would be drawn from dedicated troops 
and civilian capabilities already made 
available by member states as well as a 
proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer 
Service’. 
• A new legal framework to govern both 
decisions to intervene and operations 
on the ground. This would build on the 
domestic law of host states, the domes-
tic law of sending states, international 
criminal law, international human 
rights law and international humanitar-
ian law.” (Ibid.: 1) 
By detailing “capabilities” in 
the form of force structure and or-
ganization – especially the EU Human 
Security Response Force of 15,000 
personnel (roughly the size of a divi-
sion) – the doctrine notably comprises 
both military and civilian specialists, 
able to deploy to locales as disparate 
as Macedonia, Kosovo, or the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo. The force 
itself would be tiered, drawing first 
on staff and headquarters capabilities 
from Brussels, with a secondary force 
of 5,000 personnel able to deploy in 
ten days. The final tier of 5,000 per-
sonnel would remain at a lower level 
of readiness but would periodically 
train and exercise together (Ibid.: 18-
19). 
The force would also draw 
from a professional core, with a civil-
ian component of doctors, medical 
personnel, legal specialists, human 
rights monitors, and those who 
“straddle” the military/police divide 
such as carabinieri or gendarmerie. The 
final aspect of this organization 
would be the “Human Security Vol-
unteer Service.” (Ibid.: 20) All would 
be expected to be culturally aware, 
multinational, attuned to the multiple 
dimensions of conflict and interven-
tion, and imbued with a specific, 
dedicated ethos. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private 
corporations might also comprise part 
of the “Human Security Volunteer 
Service.” 
In short, this EU Human Secu-
rity Force would represent an ambi-
tious, even breathtaking, initiative to 
respond to crisis challenges. By re-
sponding simply to direct threats, the 
doctrine itself might be nothing more 
than a well-thought through interven-
tion force proposal; itself, it would 
remain little more than a response 
force to violence and its aftermath. 
However, by clearly distinguishing 
the roles of civic, humanitarian and 
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military responses to this violence, the 
proposed “doctrine” is taking a sig-
nificant step away from the historic 
traditional security response. Yet the 
doctrine bears a direct lineage with 
the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
nonetheless, and takes from it a focus 
on direct threats: terrorism, the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, regional conflicts, failing states, 
and organized crime (ESS 2003: 6-9). 
 
3. Unpacking Security Strategy: The European 
and U.S. Examples 
One might (correctly) argue 
that little consideration is given in the 
EU human security doctrine regard-
ing the broader conception of human 
security. Yet the example of why it is 
important to recognize these broader 
human security necessities – and act 
on them – is deeply embedded in the 
European Security Strategy itself. Nota-
bly, nowhere in the EU strategy – or 
the U.S. National Security Strategy, for 
that matter – do the words “human 
security” appear. Yet its principles, 
including the need to address and 
solve longer-term development issues 
that could actually sustain and re-
solve the security dilemma of many in 
nations and in regions in crisis, are 
omnipresent. Indeed, the strategy’s 
full title presents the claim of A Secure 
Europe in a Better World, thus stressing 
the need for the EU to “get real” and 
act on its responsibility and in its role 
as global actor: 
“Since 1990, almost 4 million people have 
died in wars, 90 percent of them civilians. 
Over 18 million people world-wide have left 
their homes as a result of conflict. 
In much of the developing world, poverty 
and disease cause untold suffering and give 
rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 
billion people, half the world’s population 
live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 [sic] mil-
lion die every year of hunger and malnutri-
tion. AIDS is now one of the most devastat-
ing pandemics in human history and con-
tributes to the breakdown of societies. […] 
Security is a precondition for development. 
[…] 
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the 
Cold War, none of the new threats is purely 
military, nor can any be tackled by purely 
military means. Each requires a mixture of 
instruments […] Regional conflicts need po-
litical solutions but military assets and effec-
tive policing may be needed in the post con-
flict phase. Economic instruments serve re-
construction, and civilian crisis management 
helps restore civil government. The Euro-
pean Union is particularly well equipped to 
respond to such multi-faceted situations.” 
(ESS 2003: 3) 
The U.S. National Security Strat-
egy of 2002, which emphasized the 
“non-negotiable demand of human 
dignity” and the reduction (if not 
eradication) of poverty, also leans to-
ward the broader conception of hu-
man security through long-term de-
velopment, free trade and free mar-
kets, and the practice of good govern-
ance and policies. However, the na-
tional interest in tackling vulnerability 
abroad is argued in notably moralistic 
terms, this differing significantly from 
the securitization of these issues in the 
EU ‘Doctrine’. And although the spe-
cific organization and deployment of 
military forces is never detailed in 
official Bush administration docu-
ments and declarations, the sentiment 
to respect “freedom” is unquestion-
able: 
“There is only one force of history that can 
break the reign of hatred and resentment, 
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and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and 
reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, 
and that is the force of human freedom. […] 
The best hope for peace in our world is the 
expansion of freedom in all the world. […] 
Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and 
defended by citizens, and sustained by the 
rule of law and the protection of minorities. 
And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, 
the institutions that arise may reflect customs 
and traditions very different from our own. 
America will not impose our own style of 
government on the unwilling. Our goal in-
stead is to help others find their own voice, 
attain their own freedom, and make their 
own way.” (Bush 2005) [Notably, as of this 
writing, no U.S. Military Strategy has been 
officially published since 1997 – although 
draft update documents (which have, to 
date, been rejected) have been circulating 
within the Pentagon for the last several 
years] 
U.S. strategy documents and 
declarations do not detail how mili-
tary forces uphold human security; 
rather, the emphasis remains on good 
practice of governments and on de-
velopment as issues that receive prior-
ity (NSS 2002, in particular i-ii). Fur-
ther, it is hard to parse the statement’s 
significant shift towards unilateral 
preventative use of force and the ex-
panded list of conditions under which 
this might be justified with the 
broader signals towards human secu- 
 
rity principles. 
What distinguishes the respec-
tive EU strategy and subsequent hu-
man security doctrine are 1) establish-
ing a clear “objective” for “stronger 
international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule-
based order” (ESS 2003: 14); 2) a basic 
recognition that “establishing the rule 
of law and protecting human rights 
are the best means of strengthening 
the international order” (Ibid.: 16) and 
3) a detailed operational force pro-
posal for protecting human security. 
Taken collectively, these documents 
implicitly recognize the fragile web of 
security, and that no single instru-
ment – no matter how seemingly 
powerful in its application – is suffi-
cient to address new and emerging 
security issues. The old cliché that 
describes the “blowback” that other-
wise often occurs is an apt reminder: 
If all you have is a hammer, then every 
problem begins to look like a nail. Surely, 
as the interventions in Somalia and in 
the Balkans illustrate, traditional ap-
plications of military security are of-
ten necessary, but certainly not suffi-




4. The Intervention Dilemma 
Ultimately, all nations and all 
alliances are far from what O’Hanlon 
and Singer term a global intervention 
capability on behalf of “humanitarian 
transformation” (O’Hanlon/Singer 
2004: 77-99) Granted, the threat of 
mass casualty terrorism now exists 
anytime, anywhere – and states and 
regions are responding differently to 
this challenge. Yet the global commu-
nity today also faces many of the 
same problems of the 1990s: civil 
wars, faltering states, and humanitar-
ian crises. While Europe and the 
European Union are perhaps no 
closer than anyone else to addressing 
how best to solve these challenges, 
Europe has at least acknowledged the 
need to think, act, and organize dif-
ferently to prepare for the future. Spe-
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cifically, the EU security strategy 
stresses the necessity of “effective 
multilateralism” and often acknowl-
edges the crucial leadership roles of 
the U.S. in making this multilateral-
ism both coherent and effective (ESS 
2003: 14-16; 20). 
Essentially, states and regions, 
in a globalized context, can no longer 
afford to solely emphasize national 
security issues without recognizing 
that abstract concepts such as values, 
norms, and expectations also influ-
ence both choice and outcome. In its 
most recent declarations, the Euro-
pean Union appears to have incorpo-
rated these recognitions as a basic  
ethos in approaching security. Yet, as 
the blatant international failures to do 
anything in 1994 in Rwanda and in 
Darfur in 2005 illustrate – other than a 
collective international decision to do 
nothing – human security is hardly 
proving to be the trump card of choice 
in decisions by states to intervene in 
the affairs of other states, to include 
violating traditionally respected 
rights of sovereignty. In other words, 
taken to extreme forms, both human 
security and national security can be 
conceptually approached as antago-
nistic rather than convergent identi-




5.  Moving to a Global Security Commitment 
While sounding the death knell 
for NATO and the transatlantic rela-
tionship is hardly a certainty, many 
believe this has become a more likely 
possibility in recent years. Charles 
Kupchan, a former National Security 
Council member, has been quite clear 
in his views on the security dilemma:  
“The Atlantic alliance appears poised for 
demise. Its founder and primary patron, the 
United States, is losing interest in the alli-
ance, resulting in a military pact that is hol-
lowing out and of diminishing geopolitical 
relevance. […] Europe’s security order is 
thus in the process of becoming much more 
European and much less Atlantic.” (Kupchan 
2003: 225-226) 
At one point in history (known 
as the Cold War), the “hard” security 
map took precedence over all other 
mental maps – and NATO was the 
key security linkage. Clearly, that se-
curity map is shifting in front of our 
eyes. In response to that shift, none-
theless, the EU, perhaps paradoxi-
cally, both distanced itself from the 
U.S. in creating specific security 
documents yet simultaneously made 
clear overtures to the U.S. in recogniz-
ing enduring security linkages: 
“The United States has played a critical role 
in European integration and European secu-
rity, in particular through NATO. The end of 
the Cold War has left the United States in a 
dominant position as a military actor. How-
ever, no single country is able to tackle to-
day’s complex problems on its own. […] The 
transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. 
Acting together, the European Union and the 
United States can be a formidable force for 
good in the world. Our aim should be an ef-
fective and balanced partnership with the 
USA.” (ESS 2003: 3; 20) 
Today, when we speak of the 
business of security – for the individ-
ual, the state, the community, and for 
regions – we find us ourselves mired 
in a complex web of seemingly end-
lessly contradictions. Perhaps one of 
the most overlooked aspects of the 
broadening future security architec-
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ture lies in how Greater Europe has 
attempted to address common aspects 
of security and interests, rather than 
the exclusive self-interests of states.  
By doing so, there has occurred 
a gradual shift toward what can only 
be called “global security.” 
In moving toward an evolving 
commitment to global security, the 
EU has demonstrated some new, use-
ful thinking. As a force proposal, and 
as a natural extension of the European 
security strategy, the EU human secu-
rity doctrine does not address all 
problematic issues – and raises, inter-
nally, a few problematics of its own in 
terms of feasibility. It remains unclear, 
for example, how the EU is truly  
broadening its capabilities to respond 
with an overarching human security 
policy – other than addressing the 
necessity to act, to be ready to inter-
vene when necessary, and to have the 
organization and structure to do it 
(For the argument that human secu-
rity requires a critical transformative 
ethos, see Grayson 2004, 2003) 
Equally, how to deal with strategic 
challenges (such as long-term invest-
ment and planning) or pragmatic fac-
tors (such as the question of how un-
armed civilian specialists would 
themselves be vulnerable in interven-
tion situations) remain, as yet, unan-





Bush, George W. 2005: Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html 
(February 10, 2005) 
European Security Strategy, ESS 2003: A Secure Europe in a Better World: 
European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (7.02.2005); http://www. 
iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf 
Glasius, Marlies/Said, Yahia 2005: Europe Needs a Human Security Doctrine – 
And New Force with One Third Civilians. (Press Release) 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915PreRelBar 
.pdf (7.02.2005) 
Grayson, Kyle 2004: A Challenge to Power over Knowledge in Traditional Secu-
rity Studies, in: Security Dialogue, 35 (3): 357. 
Grayson, Kyle (2003): Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to 
Liotta and Smith-Windsor, in: Security Dialogue, 34 (3): 337-343. 
Kagan, Robert 2004: America’s Crisis of Legitimacy, in: Foreign Affairs, 83 (2): 75. 
Kaldor, Mary 1999: New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 
Palo Alto. 
 
P.H. Liotta/Taylor Owen 
80 
Kupchan, Charles A. 2003: The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Interna-
tionalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy, in: Political Science Quarterly, 18 
(2): 225-226. 
National Security Strategy, NSS 2002: The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America, September 2002. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (9.02.2005). 
O’Hanlon, Michael/Singer, P. W. 2004: The Humanitarian Transformation: Ex-
panding Global Intervention Capacity, in: Survival, 46 (1): 77-99. 
S239/04: Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Responds to Re-
port by Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities.  
http://ue.eu.int/solana (February 7, 2005) 
Schweiss, Christina M. (2003): Sharing Hegemony: The Future of Transatlantic 
Security, in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Interna-
tional Studies Association, 38 (3): 211-234. 
Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004: A Human Security Doc-
trine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security%20Report%20 
Full.pdf> (February 7, 2005). 
 
Recently Published INEF Reports 
 
Debiel, Tobias/Sascha Werthes (Eds.): Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas. 
Changes, Concepts and Cases. Duisburg (INEF Report, 80/2006), 80 pp. 
Debiel, Tobias/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian 
and Conflict Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg (INEF 
Report, 79/2005), 44 pp. 
Stempel, Philipp: Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof - Vorbote eines Weltinnenrechts? 
Eine Studie zur Reichweite einer rule of law in der internationalen Politik. 
Duisburg (INEF-Report 78/2005), 72 S. 
Kocks, Alexander: The Financing of UN Peace Operations - An Analysis from a Global 
Public Good Perspective. Duisburg (INEF Report 77/2005), 95 pp. 
Hirsch, Alfred: Menschenrechte des Fremden: Zur Grundlegung einer interkulturellen 
Menschenrechtsethik. Duisburg (INEF-Report 76/2005), 46 S. 
Blome, Kerstin: Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht? Herausforderungen bei der 
Etablierung eines Weltinnenrechts im Politikfeld Menschenrechte. Duisburg 
(INEF-Report 75/2004), 56 S. 
Böge, Volker: Neue Kriege und traditionale Konfliktbearbeitung. Duisburg (INEF-
Report 74/2004), 69 S. 
Fuchs, Martina/Michael Giese: Globale Arbeitsteilung - transnationale 
Kompetenzaufteilung. Beispiele aus der Automobilzulieferindustrie. Duisburg 
(INEF-Report 73/2003), 36 S. 
Falk, Gertrud: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers - eine Chance zur Bekämpfung 
ländlicher Armut in Subsahara-Afrika. Duisburg (INEF-Report 72), 50 S. 
Führmann, Bettina: Abkehr vom Washington Concensus? Die wirtschaftspolitische 
Strategie der Weltbank zur Armutsbekämpfung. Duisburg (INEF-Report 






Single Copies can be ordered at: 
Institute for Development and Peace, Universität Duisburg-Essen, D-47048 Duisburg. 
Please add 0.95 EUR in stamps. 
Almost all reports can be downloaded on the internet, see: 
http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/englisch/PublSerien.html 
The Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) 
 
The Institute was founded in 1990 on the basis of a cooperation agreement between the 
Development and Peace Foundation (SEF), Bonn, and the University of Duisburg-Essen. Based 
on an interdisciplinary approach, INEF is concerned with 
o global trends and global governance, 
o interrelationships between development and peace in developing countries, 
o global interdependencies between the economy, the environment, and security, 
o development perspectives of developing countries in the World Economy 
o the interplay between states, international organizations, the business sector, and civil 
society in world politics. 
INEF and the SEF have set themselves the goal of 
o playing a role in shaping the national, European, and international dialogue concerning 
global interdependencies and global governance, and 
o providing impulses for political action, based on global responsibility, in North and 
South, East and West 
INEF, often in cooperation with national and international partners, conducts research 
programs and systematically explores available international expertise and world reports. The 
Institute is integrated in a strong and viable international research network. 
Directors and Executive Board 
Director: Prof. em. Dr. phil. Franz Nuscheler 
Executive Director: Dr. sc. pol. Tobias Debiel 
Members of the Executive Board: Prof. em. Dr. phil. Franz Nuscheler, (spokesperson); Prof. Dr. 
Peter Meyns (deputy spokesperson); Prof. Dr. Michael Bohnet; Min.Dir. a.D. Dr. h.c. Winfried 
Böll; Prof. Dr. Thomas Heberer; Prof. Dr. Klaus Hänsch (MEP); Prof. Dr. Gerhard Bäcker (Dean 
of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University Duisburg-Essen). 
The INEF Report series 
INEF Report is a series that appears at irregular intervals. It publishes major findings from the 
institute’s ongoing research projects as well as overview studies on academic and policy 
debates concerning global issues. INEF Reports are primarily addressed to the research 
community and students of international relations, but also try to reach out to policy-makers 
interested in relevant scholarly results. 
 
INEF Report 80/200 6                         ISSN 0941-4967
UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG-ESSEN 
   FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Institute for Development and Peace
Geibelstraße 41 D - 47057 Duisburg 
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425 
E-Mail: inef@uni-duisburg.de 
Homepage: http://www.inef.de 
